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The Draft International Antitrust Code
Proposed at Munich: Good Intentions
Gone Awry
Daniel J. Giffordt
INTRODUCTION
Because private exclusionary arrangements can potentially
effectively neutralize the market-opening efforts undertaken by
governments, they have long been the subject of international
concern.1 Manifestations of this concern extend back to 1948
when delegates to the Havana Conference approved a set of pro-
visions directed against cartels and restrictive business prac-
tices.2 Periodically, government officials and others have
focused upon the question of whether restrictive agreements
among private business firms may impede trade. As a host of
international agreements have progressively eliminated or have
placed limits on government-erected trade barriers, attention
has increasingly focused upon privately-erected barriers, i.e.,
those resulting from cartel-like exclusionary activities of private
business firms.
The United States has repeatedly complained that the do-
mestic markets of some nations, though freed from official trade
t Robins, Kaplan, Miller, & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minne-
sota. The author gratefully acknowledges the support and encouragement of
his colleague, Professor Robert Hudec.
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened
for signature Nov. 23, 1957, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, arts. 85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The Treaty of
Rome contains competition-law provisions designed to ensure that private
agreements do not carve up the all-European market. In its first competition-
law decision under the Treaty of Rome, the European Court of Justice ruled
that the Treaty did not permit exclusive distribution agreements coincident
with national boundaries to bar shipments of goods between member states,
even though contractual prohibitions on interstate shipments were limited to
goods of a single brand. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablishments Consent,
SA.R.L. v. Commission, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 341.
2. Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, Mar. 24,
1948 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba),
reprinted in U.S. DEP'T ST. COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES 113 (1947) (Dep't St.
Publication 3117).
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barriers under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT) 3 , have nonetheless been closed to foreign suppliers as
a result of exclusionary actions taken by private cartels. 4 Gen-
erally, the most effective remedy in cases where a domestic car-
tel excludes foreign suppliers lies in the enforcement of
competition laws against the cartel. Thus, where nations ad-
here to a treaty removing or reducing trade barriers, a set of
competition laws is a natural complement to such a treaty in
order to ensure that private agreements do not frustrate the
treaty objectives by erecting or maintaining private trading
barriers.
The United States possesses a rich antitrust-law tradition
extending back to the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890. 5
Americans thus tend to assume that other nations also control
restrictive business practices within their territories. In fact,
the control of the anticompetitive practices of private business
concerns in most nations is a relatively new idea. Europe, for
example, adopted competition-law provisions into the Treaty of
Rome in 1958.6 Japan adopted its Anti-Monopoly Law during
the American occupation upon the insistence of Allied authori-
ties,7 and later weakened it substantially.8
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. The GATT has now been
succeeded by the World Trade Organization. See Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994,
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND VOL. 1 (1994) 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) (includes the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and other related
agreements).
4. For example, the United States brought market-closing behavior by
foreign cartels within the scope of Sherman Act enforcement. Antitrust: U.S.
Broadens Enforcement Posture on Foreign Application of Sherman Act, 9 Intl
Trade Rep. (BNA) 622 (Apr. 8, 1992). Competition law concerns were also a
focus of U.S. and Japanese discussions under the Structural Impediments Initi-
ative. Interim Reports of U.S. and Japanese Delegations on Talks Under Struc-
tural Impediments Initiative, Released April 5 [19901, 7 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA)
527, 536 (Apr. 11, 1990).
5. See, e.g., RUDOLPH J. R. PERIr, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-
1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAw (1996).
6. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
7. MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAw 3
(1990). See SHIGETO TSURU, CREATIVE DEFEAT AND BEYOND: JAPANESE CAPITAL-
ISM SINCE THE WAR 18-20, 40-42 (Mark Perlman ed., paperback ed. 1994).
8. MATSUSHITA, supra note 7, at 3. Amendments to the Anti-Monopoly
law of 1953, inter alia, authorized the Japanese Fair Trade Commission
("JFTC") to license both "depression cartels" and "rationalization cartels". MIT-
SUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAw IN JAPAN 79-80
(1993). The amendments also altered the general treatment of cartels from per
[Vol. 6:1
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Both European and Japanese approaches to enforcement
and interpretation differ substantially from U.S. approaches.
Since the mid 1970s, the courts have construed U.S. antitrust
law as intended to further productive and allocative efficiency as
its exclusive goals.9 European competition law, by contrast, ac-
knowledges several competing goals besides efficiency.10 The
Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law bends to accommodate Japanese
industrial policy and includes a number of specific provisions ex-
empting a host of cartel arrangements. 1 ' Both European and
Japanese law have a tendency to focus upon vertical restraints
to a larger extent than the current U.S. practice. 12 In the area
of vertical restraints, the European and Japanese approaches
resemble U.S. approaches prevalent in the 1960s and early
se illegality to a prohibition only when they caused a substantial restraint of
competition in a particular field of trade. Id. at 78. In addition, they relaxed
the treatment of mergers and acquisitions, and permitted resale price mainte-
nance of books, records, other copyrighted materials and all JFTC exempted
materials. Id. The amendments, however, did widen the prohibition of unfair
practices to protect smaller companies from the exercise of bargaining power by
larger suppliers. Id. at 81. See H. IYORI & A. UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS
AND POLICIES OF JAPAN 32-34 (1994) (discussing the 1953 amendments to Ja-
pan's Anti-Monopoly Law).
9. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV.
1677, 1680-81 (1995); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 7-8 (1978) (ar-
ticulating the exclusive focus upon economic efficiency which the Court was in
the process of adopting).
10. For example, the Treaty of Rome explicitly condemns the imposition of
dissimilar conditions in equivalent transactions, where parties are placed at a
competitive disadvantage. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85(1)(d) & 86(c).
These provisions appear more concerned with fairness than with the mainte-
nance of competition. Article 85 provides that agreements falling within the
strictures of Article 85(1) but which can be shown to improve the production or
distribution of goods or to promote technical or economic progress cannot be
validated unless consumers are allowed a "fair share" of these benefits. This
requirement seems to focus on distributional effects rather than productive or
allocative efficiency.
11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In addition to the depression
and rationalization cartels authorized under Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law, forty-
two other laws exempted cartels from the application of the Anti-Monopoly
Law. Daniel J. Gifford & Mitsuo Matsushita, Antitrust or Competition Laws
Viewed in a Trading Context: Harmony or Dissonance?, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND
HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 317 app. A (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). Authorized cartels included export/
import cartels, medium and small business cartels, shipping conferences, inter-
national agreements on tariffs and other terms of business in aviation, activi-
ties of insurance associations and others. Id. at 318.
12. See H. IYoRu & A. UESUGI, supra note 8, at 113-25 (discussing Japanese
approaches to vertical restraints); VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE
TO EEC COMPETITION LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 8.1-8.8, 137-55 (4th ed. 1990) (out-
lining ECC approaches to vertical restraints).
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1970s. In this context, the difficulties of reaching agreement
upon a broadly acceptable design for domestic competition laws
are apparent. Indeed, the American Bar Association's Special
Committee on International Antitrust concluded in 1991 that no
worldwide standards for competition law are feasible. 13 Even
international discussion about harmonizing competition laws
presents a substantial challenge, since the participants are
likely to approach the subject with preconceptions arising out of
their differing cultural experiences. 14
I. THE DRAFT ANTITRUST CODE: ITS HISTORY AND
THE OBSTACLES IN OBTAINING U.S. SUPPORT
In 1993 a group of antitrust scholars meeting in Munich,
Germany, released a draft International Antitrust Code, which
they proposed for adoption as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade
Agreement. 15 These scholars addressed the need for GATT-ad-
hering nations to complement their movement towards freer
trade under the GATT with domestic competition laws ensuring
that markets throughout the world would be free of private re-
straints as well as government restraints. Their response to this
problem, even though a flawed one, was an historic event. It
was another step on the road towards international enforcement
of free and open markets. Nonetheless, the Draft Antitrust
Code fails in critical respects to provide a workable model for an
international antitrust regime.
The Draft Antitrust Code is a draft agreement rather than a
code. It requires adhering nations to enact minimum antitrust
standards into their domestic law. The draft agreement then es-
tablishes procedures designed to ensure that these national
standards in fact conform to the minimum standards mandated
by the agreement and are effectively administered.
Because the authors of the Draft Antitrust Code included
scholars from a number of nations, the Code is heavily influ-
enced by European approaches. It thus tends to identify prohib-
ited behavior through conceptual rather than economic
approaches. The Draft Antitrust Code also tends to phrase its
13. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, SPECIAL COM-
MrrrEE ON INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST REPORT 294 (1991).
14. See Gifford & Matsushita, supra note 11, at 269.
15. Draft International Antitrust Code as a GATT-MTO-Plurilateral Trade
Agreement (International Antitrust Code Working Group Proposed Draft
1993), published and released July 10, 1993, 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 1628 (Aug. 19, 1993) (Special Supp.) [hereinafter Draft Antitrust
Code].
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prohibitions in overly broad and often ambiguous language. For
these reasons alone, the Code would not be acceptable in the
United States. In addition, the Code would be objectionable in
the United States because it contains a number of procedural
flaws. The Code confers immense power upon a group of ap-
pointed officials who hold office for many years. These officials
would thus possess long-lasting power to exploit ambiguities in-
herent in the Code's provisions. Yet, the Code provides no effec-
tive recourse against the very real possibility of its misuse. In
the pages that follow, I will attempt to point out some of the
major deficiencies of the Draft Antitrust Code.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT
ANTITRUST CODE
The Draft Antitrust Code contains eight parts and twenty-
one articles. As might be expected in such an ambitious project,
problematic provisions permeate the Code. This article ad-
dresses the flaws and ambiguities of the substantive provisions
and examines the procedural and organizational provisions that
seem troublesome. Parts two, three and four set forth the sub-
stantive provisions of the Draft Antitrust Code, which concern
respectively: horizontal and vertical restraints, control of con-
centration and restructuring, and abuse of dominant position.
Part two of the Code covers horizontal and vertical restraints,
matters which are governed by section one of the Sherman Act 16
in the United States and article eighty-five of the Treaty of
Rome in the European Union. Part three of the Code deals with
control of concentration and restructuring, matters which are
governed by section seven of the Clayton Act' 7 and section one of
the Sherman Act in the United States, and which are governed
by articles eighty-five and eighty-six of the.Treaty of Rome (and
the merger regulation)' 8 in the European Union. Part four of
the Code covers abuse of dominant position, a matter which is
governed by section two of the Sherman Act 19 in the United
States and article eighty-six of the Treaty of Rome in the Euro-
pean Union. Part five of the Code sets forth procedural provi-
sions and part seven contains structural provisions governing
the Code's implementation. This article addresses many of the
16. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
17. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
18. Council Regulation 4064/89 1989 O.J. (L395/1), [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 286.
19. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
1997]
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major substantive provisions of the Code and then proceeds to
discuss the procedural and organizational provisions.
A. HomizoNTAL AGREEMENTS
Article four of the Draft Antitrust Code deals with horizon-
tal agreements. 20 The Code defines agreements broadly to em-
brace "[aigreements, understandings and concerted practices".21
It then creates a class of agreements which are effectively per se
illegal and a second class nominally treated under a rule-of-rea-
son approach.22 The class of per se illegal agreements consists
of agreements among competitors that "fix prices, divide custom-
ers or territories, or assign quotas. .. "2 In creating such rigidly
defined categories of per se offenses, the Code appears to follow a
typical European approach of identifying classes of behavior for
uniform treatment regardless of the economic consequences. As
Professor Valentine Korah has pointed out, this approach often
produces unintended results which could be avoided under an
approach based upon economic principles. 24 The latter ap-
proach, often followed in U.S. law, allows more flexibility and
condemns behavior only when indicated by the governing eco-
nomic principle. As a result, decisions under the latter approach
are more likely to lead to economically rational outcomes.
Article four section one, which creates the first per se cate-
gory, provides an example of uniform treatment regardless of
economic consequences. This provision makes all agreements
which "fix prices" illegal per se.25 If agreements which "fix
prices" are equivalent to agreements on selling prices, then sec-
tion one is overbroad because many agreements about selling
prices are procompetitive. Perhaps the drafters intended the
phrase "fix prices" to refer to agreements which actually control
market prices. If so, the provision is less overbroad, but it still
may condemn behavior resulting in efficiencies or even behavior
producing an expansion of output, as illustrated in the U.S. case,
20. Horizontal agreements are agreements among competitors. See, e.g.,
Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1091-92 (6th Cir. 1996) (defin-
ing "horizontal" agreements).
21. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 4, § 1, at S-11.
22. Id '
23. Id. art. 4, § 2, at S-11.
24. See KoRAH, supra note 12, § 8.3.1, at 141 (analyzing European Commu-
nity Council Regulation 1983/83 article 2). See also id. § 14.1, at 223 (criticizing
the European Economic Commission for avoiding economic analysis).
25. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 4, § 1, at S-11.
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Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.26
Nothing in section one adverts to the problems raised by such a
sweeping condemnation or articulates a recognition that some
such agreements may result in procompetitive outcomes.
The impact of section one thus depends upon the meaning
attributed to the phrase "fix prices". The Sherman Act also
treats price-fixing agreements as illegal per se.27 In construing
the Sherman Act in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
Justice Douglas asserted that prices were "fixed" when they
were "agreed upon".28 He further declared that the defendants'
power to control the market was irrelevant.29 Thus, the Court
held that a gasoline-buying program designed to remove excess
supply from the spot market was per se illegal under the Sher-
man Act because the program was intended to affect price. 30
Justice Douglas also indicated that the same result would follow
in other cases in which defendants tried to affect market prices,
regardless of whether defendants actually possessed the power
to bring about their intended results.3 1 The drafters of section
one were perhaps familiar with Justice Douglas' Socony-Vac-
uum opinion and his view of the irrelevance of market power to
the lawfulness of a price-fixing agreement. The drafters may
have thought that they had incorporated U.S. law when they
adopted the phrase "fix prices" in section one.
United States' law, however, is not so simple. Though U.S.
law recognizes a per se rule against price fixing agreements, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that per se rules should
embrace only behavior which always or almost always produces
anticompetitive effects and reduces output.3 2 Many agreements
26. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(recognizing that some agreements which literally set prices may be output-
enhancing and thus procompetitive).
27. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940)
("An agreement to pay or charge rigid, uniform prices would be an illegal agree-
ment under the Sherman Act.").
28. Id.
29. Id. at 224 n.59.
30. Id. at 223-24.
31. Id. at 225 n.59.
32. Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
723 (1988); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Print-
ing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289-90 (1985); NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
1997]
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among competitors concerning price are lawful.3 3 For example,
the Court in Broadcast Music cautioned against an overly literal
approach to price-fixing and thus consciously employed eco-
nomic analysis to guide its construction of the rule against price-
fixing.34 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States35 offers an-
other example of an agreement among competitors concerning
price which produced procompetitive results. In both Broadcast
Music and Appalachian Coals the defendants employed a device
known as a common selling agency which effectively collectivizes
the defendants' decision making concerning price. The device in
Appalachian Coals enabled the defendants to overcome informa-
tional deficiencies in the operation of the market and effectively
moved the behavior of the defendants closer to that of a properly
operating competitive market.36 Moreover, the common selling
agency created little danger of monopoly pricing because the de-
fendants produced a small share of the total coal produced and
sold it under highly competitive conditions.37 In Broadcast Mu-
sic the defendants acted as common selling agencies for owners
33. See Broadcast Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 8-9 ("[Tlwo partners [may] set
the price of their goods ... but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman
Act.").
34. Id.
35. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
36. In Appalachian Coals, several distorting practices had evolved as a re-
sult of inadequate information: distress production; pyramiding; and misrepre-
sentation. Id. at 362-63. Distress production, i.e., the production of coal in sizes
for which no present buyer exists, was a byproduct of coal extracted to meet a
particular order. Id. Pyramiding resulted when sellers commissioned several
agents to sell the same coal and each agent competed against the others. Id. at
363. Misrepresentation resulted from the lack of agreed standards on coal
sizes. Id. Sellers in the Appalachian region established a common selling
agency that was able to route to its central office all orders from buyers and
information about production from producers. Id. at 358. The selling agency
was able to vastly improve the matching of production with orders, thus miti-
gating the problem of distress production. Id. at 344. A single selling agency
also mitigated the problems of pyramiding and misrepresentation.
Because the selling agency lacked market power, it could not control price.
Id. at 373. Thus the use of a selling agency helped overcome informational defi-
ciencies and coal was sold at competitive prices. Id. at 374. This final result
better approximated conditions in a perfectly competitive market, since both
buyers and sellers possessed complete information about matters relevant to
buying and selling in such a market. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 10 (2d
ed. 1994) (describing conditions present in a perfectly competitive market).
37. Defendants produced only 11.96% of the coal mined east of the Missis-
sippi. Appalachian Coals Inc., 288 U.S. at 357. Defendants sold their product
in the "highly competitive region east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio
river." Id. at 364.
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of musical copyrights.38 Though the two common selling agen-
cies represented the majority of the copyright owners for the two
respective types of music involved,39 the arrangement brought
about a substantial reduction in transactions costs and thus ex-
panded the total amount of licensing.40
In section two of article four, the authors of the Draft Anti-
trust Code apparently intended to apply a rule-of-reason to hori-
zontal agreements other than those covered by section one. The
provision, however, is awkwardly drafted to achieve this pur-
pose. The first sentence of section two states: "[o]ther agree-
ments between or among competitors are illegal, if they
unreasonably restrict competition." 41 This phrase is defined in
the following sentence: "[an agreement restricts competition if
its purpose or effect is the lessening of competition."42 The third
sentence then provides: "[s]uch anticompetitive agreements are
presumed to unreasonably restrict competition, unless justified"
according to the provision. 43 Thus, while a rule-of-reason pur-
portedly applies to horizontal agreements not covered by section
one, sentence three presumes unlawful any agreement of which
the purpose or effect is the lessening of competition.
Section two is significantly more restrictive than the stan-
dard under current U.S. law. Under the Sherman Act, horizon-
tal agreements falling outside a per se category are evaluated
under a rule-of-reason.4 Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving
that these agreements unreasonably restrain trade.45 Under ex-
isting U.S. law this effectively means that the plaintiff must
prove the agreement will raise prices above competitive levels
and/or output will decrease below the level prevailing in a com-
petitive market.46 The Draft Antitrust Code shifts the burden
in exactly the opposite way from U.S. law. While U.S. law
presumes that agreements are lawful, the Draft Antitrust Code
38. Broadcast Music Inc., 441 U.S. at 5.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 20-22.
41. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 4, § 2, at S-11.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Profl Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 692 (1978) ("[Non-illegal per se agreements] can only be evaluated by ana-
lyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the business, the history
of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.").
45. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hospital Corp. of America, 95 F.3d 383, 392 (5th
Cir. 1996) (burden on plaintiff).
46. National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).
1997]
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presumes that agreements are unreasonable and hence
unlawful.
By its own terms, section two applies only to agreements
whose purpose or effect is the lessening of competition. Though
this provision creates the appearance that section two applies
only to agreements that are anticompetitive in fact, the lan-
guage of section two indicates otherwise. Section two provides
that agreements to which the rule-of-reason applies may be jus-
tified "by outbalancing procompetitive effects", 47 thus revealing
that the effects of lessening competition which bring it within
section two may be different from the total effects produced by
the agreement. Section two seems to break down the analysis of
horizontal restraints into two or more stages, analogous to the
evaluation of nonprice vertical restrictions under U.S. case law.
Nonprice vertical restrictions are viewed not as lessening in-
trabrand competition but as enhancing interbrand competi-
tion.48 One way of describing the total effects of such
restrictions is to say that the lessening of intrabrand competi-
tion is offset by the intensification of interbrand competition.
A similar relationship between the effects which an agree-
ment has on intrabrand and interbrand competition may some-
times be found at the horizontal level as well. These effects are
illustrated in United States v. Sealy, Inc.,49 United States v.
Topco Associates, Inc.50 and Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas
Van Lines, Inc.51 These cases involved cooperative ventures
which restrained competition among the participants but pro-
moted competition in the general market. It is unclear how the
Draft Antitrust Code would treat such cooperative ventures and
how the results under the Code would compare with results
under U.S. law. Several decades ago in the Sealy and Topco
cases, the Supreme Court declared cooperative venture arrange-
ments illegal per se on the theory that these arrangements di-
47. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 4, § 2, at S-11.
48. Vertical restrictions apply to supplier-customer relationships. Non-
price vertical restrictions may include such matters as limits upon the location
of dealers, the territory in which dealers may sell or the customers to whom
dealers may sell. Such restrictions imposed by a supplier upon its dealers les-
sens intraband competition, i.e., competition among dealers carrying the same
brand. These restrictions, however, may intensify interband competition, as
dealers are forced to seek out marginal customers and are encouraged to engage
in behavior which enhances the reputation of the brands which they carry.
49. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
50. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
51. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
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vided the market among competitors.5 2 Yet the Sealy and Topco
rulings of the Supreme Court are widely believed to have been in
error.53 In those rulings, the Court ignored the fact that defend-
ants Sealy and Topco were small cooperative ventures compet-
ing with large and powerful rivals. The Sealy and Topco
arrangements enabled a group of very small companies to
achieve advertising and other economies that were otherwise
unavailable to them. By banding together, the defendants were
able to offer more effective competition to their large rivals and
thus intensified competition in the general market. Subsequent
to those decisions, the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted
that the per se rule be limited to the kinds of behavior which
always or almost always produce anticompetitive results and re-
duce output.5 4 In 1986, Judge Robert Bork in Rothery Storage
concluded that Sealy and Topco were no longer good law because
the Supreme Court had impliedly overruled those decisions.55
The comments to section two of article four state that a con-
certed refusal to deal would be illegal if in aid of an agreement
fixing prices, allocating quotas, or dividing customers or territo-
ries.5 6 The drafters appear to have invoked the per se rule of
section one to cast light upon the lawfulness of concerted refus-
als to deal. These comments are not very helpful in resolving
the ambiguities already identified. For example, the plaintiff in
Rothery sought to invoke per se rules of illegality based upon
agreements involving a concerted refusal to deal between de-
fendant Atlas Van Lines, Inc., a common carrier of household
goods, and its several carrier agents, local companies affiliated
by contract with Atlas.5 7 These agreements governed the prices
charged by the Atlas agents5 8 and prohibited the Atlas agents
from dealing with carrier agents who failed to comply with Atlas
rules requiring carrier agents to segregate their independent op-
erations from those conducted as part of the Atlas enterprise.5 9
These agreements created a joint venture among motor carriers
which enabled a number of relatively small firms to offer nation-
52. Sealy, Inc., 338 U.S. at 354-58; Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. at 608.
53. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 9, at 1689-90 (criticizing the Sealy and
Topco decisions); William F. Baxter & Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a Consistent
Theory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements, 47 STAN. L. REV. 615, 626-27
(1995).
54. See supra note 32.
55. Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 226.
56. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 4, cmt. 3, at S-11.
57. Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 215-17.
58. Id. at 212.
59. Id. at 217.
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wide moving service. 60 Rothery thus provides an example of co-
operative agreements among several small firms which allocate
territories and fix prices facilitating procompetitive behavior.
We need more guidance from the drafters to assess how the
Draft Antitrust Code would affect an arrangement like the one
in Rothery. The Code appears prima facie to prohibit such an
arrangement.
The comments to section two add another class of concerted
refusals to deal to the per se category, a class which is described
in language strikingly similar to that used by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Station-
ary and Printing Co.6 1 In Northwest Wholesale, the Court re-
stricted the application of the per se rule governing concerted
refusals to deal to a limited class of behavior.62 The per se rule
applies to joint efforts by firms "to disadvantage competitors by
'either directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or
customers to deny relationships the competitors need in the
competitive struggle."6 3 Expanding on this statement, the
Court described the prohibited activities as cutting off "access to
a supply, facility, or market necessary to enable the boycotted
firm to compete."64 The comments to section two of the Draft
Antitrust Code use almost identical language, except that the
commentators have recast the language of the U.S. caselaw ex-
pansively. They have broadened the list of items in the U.S. for-
mulation and have transformed the degree of dependence from
facilities "needed" to compete to embrace facilities that are "im-
portant" to compete.65 This language suggests that the drafters
thought the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted the per se rule
too narrowly and that some broadening is advisable. Thus, the
drafters have made U.S. Supreme Court precedent relevant in
the Code only as a point of reference for expanding the per se
rule. Having created a distinction between "needed" and "impor-
tant", the drafters have offered no guidance for construing the
apparently more expansive latter term.
60. Id. at 211-12.
61. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
62. Id. at 295-96.
63. Id. at 294 (quoting LAWRENCE A. SULLrvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST 261-62 (1977)).
64. Id.
65. See Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 4, cmt. 3, at S-11 ("A con-
certed refusal to deal would be illegal, also, if it is comprised of competitors
attempting to deprive another competitor of sources of supply, customers, mar-
ket outlets, or information, facilities, or other means needed or important to
compete.").
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B. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Article five deals with the legality of vertical restraints.
Section one of article five defines "distribution strategies" to in-
clude "[a]greements, concerted practices and restraints in the
course of distribution of products or services."66 This defini-
tional approach attempts to bring a variety of behaviors within
the definition of the key term, "distribution strategies". This
seems to have been designed to eliminate the need to prove an
agreement or even a "combination" as an element of a viola-
tion.67 The comments to section one confirm the broad sweep of
this definition where the "inducement" of a dealer by "economic
pressure" or even ""influence" exerted by "a supplier or distribu-
tor to behave anticompetitively" constitutes a distribution strat-
egy.68 Manufacturers and suppliers therefore possess no option
like the one available under United States v. Colgate & Co. 69 of
suggesting courses of behavior to their dealers under penalty of
cutting off future supplies.
Section two of article five explicitly makes resale price
maintenance illegal. Indeed, not only is the fixing of a "resale
price" prohibited; the fixing of a "price level" is also prohibited. 70
This phrasing is particularly troubling because it is unclear
whether the adjective "resale" modifies the phrase "price level,"
which appears after the conjunction. If "resale" modifies "price
level," then the drafters appear to be acting against the back-
ground of Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp., 7 1 which ruled that a vertical price fixing agreement would
be unlawful only if it incorporated an obligation to maintain a
specific price or price level. Yet the drafters have rejected the
rationale of Business Electronics by prohibiting resale price
66. Id. art. 5, § 1, at S-12.
67. See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (a definition of distributional
restraints that considers any "contract," "combination" or "conspiracy" an ele-
ment of an antitrust violation); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
29, 37-47 (1960); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 & n.6 (1968);
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42
(1968). See also Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85 (considers "agreements",
"decisions by associations of undertakings" and "concerted practices" elements
of a violation).
68. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 5, cmt. 1, at S-12.
69. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (holding that
Colgate did not violate the Sherman Act when it announced that it would not
resupply dealers who resold goods bearing the manufacturer's brand at prices
less than those suggested by the manufacturer).
70. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 5, § 2, at S-11.
71. 485 U.S. 717, 731-35 (1988).
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maintenance, whether or not it is employed to reinforce a hori-
zontal cartel.72
An alternative interpretation of the Draft Antitrust Code is
that it condemns the fixing of a "price level" for dealers by their
supplier, whether or not the prices so fixed are "resale" prices.
Under such an interpretation, the omission of the adjective "re-
sale" would be intended to embrace the fixing of selling prices
through agency/consignment arrangements, where there is no
"resale". If that is the intention of the drafters, their prohibition
sweeps broadly indeed. It is doubtful the U.S. Supreme Court
would condemn agency/consignment arrangements today as it
did three decades ago in Simpson v. Union Oil Co.73 Moreover, a
host of lower court decisions have demonstrated that the scope
of Simpson is narrow.74 The Code thus imposes limits upon dis-
tribution arrangements that are significantly more severe than
those imposed by U.S. law.
Finally, this provision of the draft raises especially troub-
ling problems for franchise operations. Since the definition of
"distribution strategies" includes the distribution of "services,"
it appears that the article five prohibitions apply to most fast-
food, hotel and other common franchise operations. The lan-
guage prohibiting the fixing of a price level as opposed to fixing a
resale price confirms this conclusion because this particular
phrasing is necessary to fit franchise operations dealing in serv-
ices, which are incapable of being resold. 75 Here the Code seems
to again conflict with the imperatives of good business. It often
makes good business sense for franchisees to sell at prices indi-
cated or suggested by the franchisor, yet the Code fails to pro-
vide even a Colgate-like exception available to the franchisor. 76
In addition to outlawing resale price maintenance, section
two of article five prohibits distribution strategies that aid in the
enforcement of a producer or distributor cartel. Twenty five
years ago Lester Telser pointed out how resale price mainte-
72. See Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 5, § 2, at S-11 (prohibits
both the fixing of a resale price and distribution strategies that aid in the en-
forcement of a producer or distributor cartel). This structure indicates that the
fixing of resale prices is barred in itself, separate from the question of whether
such an arrangement reinforces a horizontal cartel.
73. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
74. See, e.g., Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430, 1436-39 (7th
Cir. 1986).
75. The application of article five of the Draft Antitrust Code to services is
consistent with reading the prohibition on the fixing of a "price level" as apply-
ing to nonsale transactions.
76. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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nance could reinforce such cartels,77 and in 1988 the U.S.
Supreme Court incorporated his reasoning to assess the lawful-
ness of a vertical price maintenance scheme. 78 The strange as-
pect of this provision of the Code is that it reflects the reasoning
of both Lester Telser and the Business Electronics majority
while apparently rejecting their conclusions that the anticompe-
titive character of resale price maintenance lies in its ability to
reinforce a horizontal cartel. 79
Section four of article five sets forth provisions governing
tying and exclusive supplier/customer agreements. Tying, ex-
clusive supply contracts, exclusive purchasing contracts and
"other foreclosure restraints" are illegal when they "confer or in-
crease market power" or "deny noncontracting persons access on
the merits to a significant share of an input or output market" in
circumstances in which "the foreclosed persons cannot feasibly
procure a substitute source of supply or outlet" and in which the
restraint fails a two-pronged justification.80 Such contracts may
be justified if they are reasonably necessary to improve produc-
tion or distribution and "a fair share" of the benefits will be
passed on to consumers.8 1 This language is derived from article
eighty-five of the Treaty of Rome.8 2
Though these provisions governing tying and exclusive sup-
plier/customer agreements are written in the European style,
they address problems familiar to U.S. antitrust practitioners.
Under U.S. law the lawfulness of a tying arrangement would
normally be addressed by examining the market power of the
seller over the tying product.8 3 Section four of article five, how-
ever, focuses directly upon the foreclosure of the tied product in
the market. The present U.S. approach provides some guidance
to business firms, by requiring a minimum 30% market share in
the tying product in order to establish a per se violation.8 4 In
77. Lester Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J.L. &
ECON. 86, 96-99 (1960).
78. Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
724-31 (1988) (incorporating a concern with vertical price maintenance as facili-
tating cartels, a concern earlier pointed out by Telser).
79. See supra notes 71-72, 77-78 and accompanying text.
80. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 5, § 4, at S-11.
81. Id.
82. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 85(3) (provides that the European
Economic Commission may declare the prohibitions of article 85(1) inapplicable
to certain agreements which, inter alia, contribute "to the production or distri-
bution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit.").
83. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 29-31 (1984).
84. Id. at 26-27.
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contrast, neither article five nor its comments provide guidance
for determining the parameters of what constitutes a "signifi-
cant share" of a tied product market.
C. INFLICTING DISADVANTAGES
Article seven provides, inter alia, that an "[ulndertaking
may neither solicit nor inflict disadvantages upon other under-
takings." While a European lawyer may find this provision ac-
ceptable, a U.S. antitrust lawyer would find it disturbing. This
language suggests that the law is concerned with the protection
of competitors as opposed to the protection of competition. An
emphasis upon the protection of competitors is absent in U.S.
law where competitors are protected only as a byproduct of pre-
serving open markets.8 5 Furthermore, a prohibition against in-
flicting disadvantages upon other undertakings appears
radically imprecise and, in the regime which the agreement
would establish,8 6 extremely dangerous. Perhaps this language
is intended to incorporate Steven Salop's theories about firms
taking action to raise the costs of their rivals.8 7 United States'
courts have thus far not endorsed this theory.88 This language,
however, is not simply limited to the infliction of cost disadvan-
tages in the Salop sense; literally this provision covers every
case in which one firm obtains an advantage over a rival. Yet
that is exactly what firms in competitive markets struggle to do.
Firms are constantly struggling to find more efficient production
and distribution methods, develop superior products, and ac-
quire superior technology. All of these efforts can be described
as attempts to gain advantages over rivals. Is the gaining of
such advantages over rivals equivalent to the infliction of disad-
vantages upon rivals? It is indeed hard to believe that the draft-
ers intended to prohibit the very competitive behavior which
85. See, e.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338
(1990) (competitors of defendant supplier's dealers denied standing because no
impairment of competition).
86. See infra notes 138-57 and accompanying text.
87. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Schefinan, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983) (papers and proceedings); Thomas G. Krattenmaker
& Steven C. Salop, Competition and Cooperation in the Market for Exclusionary
Rights, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 109 (1986); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C.
Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over
Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluat-
ing Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, 63 ANTrrRuST L.J. 513 (1995).
88. The Supreme Court's Eastman Kodak decision came close to endorsing
a Salop-like approach to antitrust analysis. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech-
nical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465-78 (1992).
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they overtly endorse and purport to encourage through the pro-
visions of the Code. Yet their choice of language permits this
interpretation.
D. CONTROL OF CONCENTRATION AND RESTRUCTURING
Part three of the Draft Antitrust Code deals with the re-
structuring of monopolies, as well as with mergers and acquisi-
tions. Restructuring, which is the subject of article thirteen, is
not defined by the Code's provisions. The comments to article
thirteen, however, indicate that restructuring involves "[an in-
tervention into corporate structures to reestablish competi-
tion".8 9 Thus, restructuring involves a "structural" remedy for a
structural problem. According to section one, the remedy is used
where "the market structure induces persistent abuses involv-
ing the exercise of significant market power."90
Of course, restructuring is not unknown in U.S. law. The
break-up of the Standard Oil91 and American Tobacco 92 compa-
nies in the early 1900's involved restructuring. United States'
courts, however, exhibit an aversion to restructuring and do not
order restructuring very often. Their reluctance stems from
their awareness that restructuring is likely to destroy scale or
other economies possessed by the firm or firms before them. Re-
structuring therefore risks frustrating efficiency objectives of the
antitrust laws in the name of enforcement. The Code drafters
are aware of the dangers of restructuring and they accordingly
impose limits on the availability of this remedy. Their com-
ments to article thirteen indicate that restructuring is to be or-
dered only under "exceptional" conditions93 and in any case, the
degree of concentration requisite to evoke a restructuring order
must be higher than the thresholds of merger control.94 The
comments also indicate that the propriety of recourse to restruc-
turing is related to the duration of the concentration to be reme-
died. As discussed in the following paragraphs, restructuring is
also prohibited if it would result in "disadvantages" to the "econ-
omy as such" which outweigh the enhancement of competition to
be expected from the restructuring.9"
89. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 13, cmt. 1, at S-17.
90. Id. art. 13, § 1, at S-17.
91. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77-82
(1911).
92. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 184-88 (1911).
93. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 13, cmt. 1, at S-17.
94. Id.
95. Id. art. 13, § 2(a), at S-17.
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As with much of the Code, the restructuring provisions are
replete with ambiguous language. Section one makes restruc-
turing a remedy for "persistent abuses" involving the exercise of
significant market power.9 6 It is unclear what the drafters
mean by "abuses" in this context. Perhaps they are using the
term "abuses" in the sense of "an abuse of dominant position," an
offense under article eighty-six of the Treaty of Rome97 and an
offense covered by part four and article fourteen of the Code.9s
If so, it is unclear why the restructuring provision was included
in part three with mergers and acquisitions rather than in part
four with abuse of dominant position. The interpretative
problems under article fourteen regarding abuse of dominant
position are themselves serious enough. If article thirteen incor-
porates the meaning of abuse within article fourteen, the inter-
pretative problems which it raises would be compounded. Since
the relation of article thirteen on restructuring to article four-
teen on abuse of dominant position is unclear, the interpretative
problems are even more pronounced.
Generally, the Code attempts to bar restructuring in cir-
cumstances in which it would do more harm than good. Again
the choice of language obscures rather than helps to clarify. For
instance, section two bars restructuring whenever "restructur-
ing would involve disadvantages of the economy as such out-
weighing the benefits in terms of competition, or if the order
would adversely affect overwhelming public interests."99 The
imprecision of this language is not resolved by the drafters' com-
ments, which merely state that "[riestructuring cannot be or-
dered if the effects on competition are outweighed by general
economic disadvantages or by overwhelming public interest."100
A U.S. lawyer might expect that restructuring would not be or-
dered when such an order would destroy scale economies. It is
unclear whether the Code would be construed to produce a simi-
lar result.
E. ABUSE OF DoMNANT PosmiON
Article fourteen prohibits the abuse of a dominant position
in language virtually identical to article eighty-six of the Treaty
96. Id. art. 13, § 1, at S-17.
97. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 86.
98. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 14, at S-17.
99. Id. art. 13, § 2(a), at S-17.
100. Id. art. 13, cmt. 2, at S-17.
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of Rome. 10 1 The drafters, however, wisely modified the article
eighty-six language, by deleting clause (a) of that article. Clause
(a) forbids the imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions. 10 2 The comments indicate that
the drafters wanted to avoid the possibility of courts imposing
price controls.103 Despite the elimination of clause (a), it is
doubtful whether the United States would find it advisable to
adhere to this provision. Article eighty-six is much more restric-
tive than section two of the Sherman Act. A dominant position
within the meaning of article eighty six of the Treaty of Rome
does not require the existence of monopoly power, as required by
the Sherman Act.'0 4 Moreover, a dominant position can be
abused through action which would not violate section two of the
Sherman Act, even when performed by a firm with monopoly
power. -05
F. MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS
On the surface, the merger control provisions of the Code
lack specificity. Section one of article eleven requires the Na-
tional Antitrust Authority of each nation to prohibit any "con-
centration which creates or increases the power of one or more
undertakings concerned, either separately or jointly, to impede
effective competition in the relevant market." 06 According to
the comments to section one, this standard "requires a consider-
ably higher degree of anticompetitive effects" than is required
for action against "cartel-like behavior."' 0 7 In an attempt to
clarify the meaning of "power to impede effective competition,"
the comments distinguish this power from "market domination,"
which is said to be a more "static" concept.' 08 Power is defined
in the conventional terms of monopoly power, i.e., "power to de-
termine prices, to control or restrict production or distribu-
101. Id. art. 14, at S-17. Compare Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 86(b)-
(d).
102. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 86(a).
103. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 14, cmt. 3, at S-18.
104. Case 27/27, United Brands Co. v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207, 1
C.M.L.R. 429 (1978). See KoRAH, supra note 12, § 4.2.1, at 69.
105. See KoRAH, supra note 12, § 4.3.2, at 85 (analyzing the Court's inter-
pretation of article 86 in Continental Can v. Commission, [1972] C.M.L.R. Dl,
to prohibit a merger attempt by a firm enjoying a dominant position for reason
that it constitutes anticompetitive conduct).
106. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 11, § 1, at S-15.
107. Id. art. 11, cmt. 1, at S-16.
108. Id. art. 11, cmt. 2, at S-16.
MINN J GLOBAL TRADE
tion."109 The admonition in the comments that the Code should
be confined to dealing with "clearly anticompetitive effects"
which are then equated with "monopolies and tight oligopolies"
suggests that the merger provisions are not to be read in the
prophylactic way the Clayton Act has often been read. 110 In-
stead the Code is concerned with the creation rather than the
potential of market power. By referring to article sixty-six of the
European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, the drafters pro-
vided an alternative definition as the power to hinder otherwise
effective competition in a substantial part of the market."'
The language of article eleven is no more vague than the
language of section seven of the Clayton Act.112 Much of the un-
certainty surrounding section seven, however, has been resolved
through the merger guidelines issued by the Department of Jus-
tice and the Federal Trade Commission. 1 3 To some extent, re-
cent U.S. case law is also helpful in determining the operative
requirements of section seven of the Clayton Act. 1 4 Apparently,
the authors of the Draft Antitrust Code were concerned that the
provisions of the Code afford sufficient flexibility to the various
officials who would administer it and were also concerned that
the merger provisions not deter efficient mergers. In addressing
these concerns, the drafters appear to have employed open-tex-
tured language in the Code itself, while attempting to confine its
application by admonitions in the comments. Though the draft-
ers' concern for flexibility is understandable, the Code would
have been improved had more of the confining language of the
comments been incorporated in the text of the code. In addition,
further specification along the lines of the merger guidelines of
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
would have helped to alleviate apprehensions that the merger
prohibitions would be abused by the foreign tribunals or the In-
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32(1962) (reading Clayton Act § 7 as intended to reach incipient monopolies and
trade restraints).
111. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 11, cmt. 2, at S-16.
112. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
113. Merger Guidelines-1992, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (May 5,
1992) (issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659, 663-674(9th Cir. 1990). The court rejected the government's case alleging monopoliza-
tion, attempted monopolization and violation of merger provisions of Clayton
Act § 7, based on an economic analysis relying heavily on the absence of entry
barriers. Id. This approach is similar to that of the Justice Department's
merger guidelines.
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ternational Antitrust Panel administering the Code."15 After
all, this Code is designed as an international agreement where
national approaches to antitrust differ significantly, and accord-
ingly where nations are unlikely to agree to be bound by such
open-textured language. This is especially so when the opera-
tive decisional standards will be developed later by an independ-
ent tribunal over which they have no control.
G. EFFICIENCIES
The Draft Antitrust Code is unclear on the way efficiencies
relate to the standard for merger approval. The comments to
article twelve concerning exceptions refer to "productive efficien-
cies" as a "political" justification,"16 available only in unusual
cases as a ground for approving a merger. This type of analysis
is similar to the approach employed in analyzing horizontal and
vertical agreements, where the "competitive" effects are consid-
ered separately from the "efficiency" effects."17
The Code's approaches to efficiency issues resemble the
older U.S. approach. In the past, U.S. law did not explicitly rec-
ognize efficiencies as a justification for a merger which produced
a substantial increase in concentration. In fact, the Justice De-
partment's 1982 merger guidelines refused to recognize efficien-
cies as a mitigating factor in a merger "[e]xcept in extraordinary
cases.""18 Only in the 1984 version were efficiencies accorded
recognition as a legitimate justification. "1 The earlier reluc-
tance of U.S. law to recognize efficiencies was premised, not
upon a belief that efficiencies were irrelevant, but upon an un-
derstanding that they were difficult to prove.' 20 Courts there-
fore were believed to be incapable of evaluating efficiency claims
115. See infra notes 138-57 and accompanying text.
116. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 12, cmt. 3, at S-17.
117. See supra notes 32-40, 49-55, 70-76 and accompanying text.
118. Merger Guidelines, Issued by Justice Department on June 14, 1982, and
Attorney General's Statement and FTC's Policy Statement on Horizontal Merg-
ers § V(A), Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1069, at S-11 (June 17, 1982)
(Special Supp.).
119. Merger Guidelines Issued by Justice Department, June 14, 1984, and
Accompanying Policy Statement § 3.5, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
1169, at S-8 (June 14, 1984) (Special Supp.). Though the standard employed to
evaluate efficiencies in the 1984 guidelines is nearly identical to the language
contained in the 1982 guidelines, the 1984 guidelines eliminated the limitation
on recognizing efficiencies to extraordinary cases and included evaluative crite-
ria in the text rather than in a footnote. Id. As a result, an efficiencies defense
is significanly more acceptable in the 1984 version. Id.
120. See, e.g., Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General Dy-
namics Corp., 92 HARv. L. REv. 491, 508 (1978).
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accurately. In this context it was thought that efficiencies could
best enter the decisional calculus as an element in the decision
of the Justice Department about whether to challenge a
merger.121 Thus, one way of conceptualizing this approach is to
describe the efficiency issue as outside the "competitive" con-
cerns of antitrust litigation. Rather, the efficiency issue could be
conceptualized as a "political" decision for the executive branch.
As so described, this way of addressing the efficiency issue bears
some resemblance to the way the Draft Antitrust Code deals
with the issue. 122
In recent years efficiency has become increasingly recog-
nized in the U.S. antitrust law. Not only is efficiency explicitly
recognized in merger guidelines, the courts themselves are di-
rectly addressing efficiency issues. 23 From a theoretical per-
spective, most U.S. antitrust practitioners would probably agree
with Robert Bork's policy approach in which efficiency is treated
as the ultimate criterion for assessing all antitrust restraints. 24
In a widely discussed theoretical model which Robert Bork took
from Oliver Williamson, a merger creating both substantial
market power and production efficiencies in the merged compa-
nies may be shown to further the goals of the antitrust laws so
long as the efficiencies exceed the deadweight loss which results
from the newly created market power.' 25 While Robert Bork
employs this model to illustrate his policy position under which
the law accords a positive value to efficiencies, he recognizes the
problems of proof which have troubled Oliver Williamson and
others.' 26 Ultimately, however, Bork concludes that the law can
121. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 728-31, 734-35 (1977); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies
as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18, 34
(1968).
122. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
123. E.g., United States v. Carilion Health System, 707 F. Supp. 840, 849
(W.D. Va. Feb. 13, 1989), affd mem., 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989). See also
Federal Trade Commission v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222
(11th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that antitrust law includes an efficiency defense in
the merger context but concluding that efficiencies were not proved).
124. BORK, supra note 9, at 107-15. Robert Bork notes the difficulties in
measuring tradeoffs in individual cases between market power and productive
efficiency to which Oliver Williamson has directed his attention, but concludes
that antitrust analysis can deal with otherwise difficult tradeoff problems by
formulating general rules which will produce net benefits. Id. at 128-29.
125. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 18, 27-28 (1968); BORK, supra note 9, at 124-29.
126. BORK, supra note 9, at 124-29. Professor Hovenkamp takes note of sim-
ilar problems of proof: that the courts are incapable of assessing welfare trade-
offs. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
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be vastly more open to efficiencies than it has been in the past,
in part by addressing the difficult issue of welfare tradeoffs
through general rules rather than through particularized
investigations. 127
The decision of the drafters to treat efficiency issues as a
separate "political" issue is troublesome from several perspec-
tives. Given the consensus U.S. position that efficiency is the
basic goal underlying the antitrust laws, most U.S. antitrust
lawyers would not be comfortable with a competitive analysis
which omits efficiency considerations. Furthermore, by treating
efficiency as a special "political" type of issue, the Code subjects
efficiency claims to the same set of restrictive conditions applied
to the recognition of "industrial policy" exemption§ from the
competitive analysis applied to merger evaluation.
H. INDusTRIAL PoLicY
The drafters have demonstrated their awareness of the in-
teraction between competition law and industrial policy. 128 In-
deed, they acknowledge that the pursuit of industrial policy
could jeopardize the "protection of competitive market struc-
tures."129 Nonetheless, the Code contemplates that concentra-
tions which would otherwise be barred may be justified by
"overwhelming public interests of the Parties to the Agreement
affected and [when the resulting restraint] does not unreasona-
bly harm the legitimate interests of other affected Parties." 130
The drafters describe this as a "political" justification. 13 1 These
political justifications must be approved by a national regulatory
body other than the National Antitrust Authority. 13 2 As dis-
cussed below, 133 the establishment of twin national antitrust
authorities, one with enforcement responsibilities but no polit-
ical accountability and one with political responsibilities but
without enforcement authority, does not easily sit within the
traditional U.S. governmental framework.
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 454 (1994); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, Eco-
NOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 299 (1985).
127. BORK, supra note 9, at 128-29.
128. See, e.g., MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION
LAw IN JAPAN 272-95 (1993) (discussing the relation between industrial policy
and competition policy).
129. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 12, cmt. 2, at S-17.
130. Id. art. 12, § 1, at S-16.
131. Id. art. 12, cmt. 2, at S-17.
132. Id. art. 12, § 2(a), at S-16.
133. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
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The drafters apparently felt compelled to create a merger
exception for industrial policy reasons, but were unable to con-
tain that exception. The best they could do was to express their
general preference for competitive market structures and urge
that justifications for anticompetitive mergers "be restricted to
overwhelming general public interests."134 The commentary is
more confusing than enlightening. The drafters would apply the
equivalent of a "least restrictive alternative" antitrust concept to
these industrial policy exemptions, thus denying an exemption
where the industrial policy objective could be achieved "by
means which have less restrictive effects." 135 The drafters then
include the Delphic statement: "[a] justification of the concentra-
tion is not possible if the scope of the restraint of competition
would endanger the principle of market economy in the relevant
market."136 If by this statement the drafters intended to say
that competition must be preserved in the relevant market af-
fected by a merger, then there would appear to be no need for an
exception.
In addition to allowing the adhering nations to justify merg-
ers under an industrial policy rationale, the Code also permits
an exemption from the restrictions on horizontal agreements for
so-called "crisis cartels."137 It is not entirely clear, however,
whether special procedural provisions apply to the crisis-cartel
exemption as they do to the merger exemption.
III. PROCEDURAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS
COVERED IN THE DRAFT ANTITRUST CODE
The Draft Antitrust Code establishes a right of private ac-
tion for private parties to recover damages.' 38 Though private
parties have long possessed such a right in the United States,13 9
the law of other nations often does not allow for a right of pri-
vate action. In the European Union the Treaty of Rome does not
create a right of private action, though the courts of some mem-
ber states have created rights of action for damages arising from
134. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 12, cmt. 2, at S-17.
135. Id. art. 12, cmt. 3, at S-17.
136. Id.
137. Id. art. 4, cmt. 4, at S-11. Crisis cartels are horizontal agreements for
reducing output and capacity, designed to facilitate an industry to modernize
through cooperative efforts. See, e.g., Synthetic Fiber Agreement, Aug. 2, 1984,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 10,606 (1984). See also MATSUSHITA, supra note
128, at 280-85.
138. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 15, § 6.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1988).
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infringements of the Treaty. 140 The Japanese Anti-Monopoly
Law nominally provides for private lawsuits, but as of 1986 a
private plaintiff had never been successful under the Anti-Mo-
nopoly Law. 141 Contrary to the Illinois-Brick Co. v. Illinois142
approach of the U.S. law, the Draft Antitrust Code does not
limit recovery to those directly injured. As a result, the Code
potentially may permit multiple recoveries against a single
plaintiff and/or may impose upon the courts the burden of grap-
pling with complex economic analyses necessary to prevent mul-
tiple recoveries. The U.S. Supreme Court believes such burdens
exceed the institutional capacities of the judicial system. 43
The Code appears to be structured in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity, a principle widely followed within the
European Union.'4 Under that principle problems are ad-
dressed at the most local level which can provide relief, and
higher-level authorities enter only when local authorities are
unable to provide adequate relief. Under the Code antitrust en-
forcement takes place before national tribunals. As discussed
below, the Code contemplates the establishment of an Interna-
tional Antitrust Panel, but that Panel is concerned principally
with resolving differences between adhering nations over their
Code obligations.
The procedural and administrative provisions of the Code
present additional problems. The Code requires each nation to
establish a national antitrust authority to enforce its antitrust
laws in accordance with the Code. 145 The national antitrust au-
thority is further required to be structurally independent from
the nation's government. The Code requires that the national
antitrust authority within each nation be guaranteed political
independence by law; that the national antitrust authority pos-
sess exclusive authority over the matters falling within the
140. KoRAH, supra note 12, at 16.
141. F.R Upham, The Legal Framework of Japan's Declining Industries
Policy: The Problem of Transparency in Administrative Processes, 27 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 425, 444-45 (1986) (reporting that as of 1986 no private action had
ever been successful under the Japanese Antimonopoly Law).
142. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 744-48 (1977) (limiting
standing in price-fixing cases to purchasers who purchased directly from the
conspirators).
143. See, e.g., Associated General Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. California
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535-46 (1982).
144. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 3b, 1992 O.J. (C 191)
(Maastricht).
145. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 17, § 1, at S-19.
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Code; and that the authority have exclusive control over all deci-
sions relating to its staff.146
A. THE NATIONAL LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF
THE DRAFT ANTITRUST CODE
1. The National Antitrust Authorities
The political independence of the national antitrust authori-
ties is not an approach which fits easily with U.S. governmental
institutions. Under the U.S. Constitution, enforcement authori-
ties are normally part of the executive branch. The U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice is the principal agency concerned with the
enforcement of the antitrust laws, and acts under the supervi-
sion of the Attorney General, who is a member of the President's
Cabinet and who is subject to removal by the President. It is by
virtue of their responsibility to the President that the enforce-
ment authorities are ultimately deemed responsible to the elec-
torate. It is also true that the Federal Trade Commission
("FTC") enforces some of the antitrust laws and the FTC is a so-
called "independent" agency. 147 Thus, the FTC is an institution
much like the "national antitrust authorities" contemplated by
the Code. Yet the independence of the FTC from the President
remains a complex matter under U.S. constitutional law and a
subject of some controversy. Indeed, scholars who wish to de-
fend the constitutionality of the independent agencies some-
times argue that their independence is more appearance than
reality. 148 On a superficial level, however, the FTC is one of the
independent agencies, and its independence was confirmed in
1935 by the Supreme Court's decision in Humphrey's Executor v.
United States.1 49 Were the United States to adhere to the agree-
ment underlying the Code, the FTC would probably be
designated as the national antitrust authority in charge of en-
forcement actions under the Code.
146. Id. § 1(b), at S-19.
147. The problems of the "independent agencies" are discussed in Daniel J.
Gifford, The Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Regulatory Agencies After
Bowsher v. Synar, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 441 (1987). See also Jim C. Chen,
Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of Binational Arbitral Re-
view Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1455 (1992).
148. See, e.g., Peter Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separa-
tion of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573, 615, 640-41, 649,
663 (1984) (contending that even "independent" agencies are in fact subject to
significant Presidential control).
149. 295 U.S. 602, 606-07, 614-18 (1935).
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2. The National Political Authorities.
In addition to requiring each adhering nation to establish
an independent National Antitrust Authority to bring enforce-
ment actions under the Code, the Code also requires each adher-
ing nation to designate a public body charged with approving
mergers on the ground of furthering the "overwhelming public
interest".150 This standard and its likely application are dis-
cussed in previous sections of this article. 151 The drafters recog-
nize the superficial incompatibility of this "overwhelming public
interest" standard with the pro-competitive focus of the Draft
Antitrust Code, and by requiring the establishment of a sepa-
rate decision-making body for these anticompetitive decisions,
the drafters have attempted to maintain the integrity of the re-
mainder of their decisional apparatus.
As suggested earlier, drafters may have attributed a narrow
meaning to "competition," a meaning which excludes efficiency
concerns. 152 The structure of several provisions of the Draft An-
titrust Code seems to confirm this approach. It is possible,
therefore, that the drafters would include efficiency concerns
within the scope of the "overwhelming public interest" standard.
This would thus institutionalize the separation of competitive
concerns from efficiency concerns beyond the requirements, else-
where in the Code, for considering these issues separately. 153
Under this understanding, the work of the separate national
political authorities would incorporate the efficiency concerns
which under U.S. law are part of a competitive assessment with
other anticompetitive concerns such as the attainment of indus-
trial-policy objectives. The result would be that efficiency as
an antitrust value would be eroded or lost in the Code's
administration.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL OF ENFORCEMENT AND
OVERSIGHT OF THE DRAFT ANTITRUST CODE: THE
INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES
At the international level, the Code contemplates an "execu-
tive" authority, designated the International Antitrust Author-
ity, composed of a President appointed for a six-year
nonrenewable term, and a twenty-member Council similarly ap-
150. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 12, § 2, at S-16.
151. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
153. Id.
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pointed. 54 It also contemplates a "judicial" tribunal, designated
the International Antitrust Panel. 155 The International Anti-
trust Authority possesses the power to ask the National Anti-
trust Authorities of individual nations to institute actions, and
in the absence of action by the National Authority to institute
actions itself in the national courts. 156 The International Anti-
trust Authority also has the power to bring suit against private
firms and it has the right of appeal in all cases, including those
to which it is not a party. Finally, it has the power to charge an
adhering nation with a violation of the Code and to bring that
nation before the International Antitrust Panel.
The members of the International Antitrust Panel are ap-
pointed for six year, once-renewable terms. The drafters inten-
tionally designed their Panel differently from the traditional
GATT practice of employing individuals chosen ad hoc for partic-
ular cases. Rather the intention here was to secure expertise
and continuity through relatively long-term appointments of an-
titrust specialists. 157
By creating both an independent executive authority and an
independent judicial authority, the drafters hoped to ensure
that the obligations undertaken by adhering nations would be
effectively enforced. These institutional arrangements, how-
ever, are flawed because they bestow immense power on the offi-
cials of the executive and judicial authorities with little
guidance provided by the Code provisions as to how they should
exercise their discretion.
CONCLUSION
The Draft Antitrust Code is another step towards the
achievement of a widely shared goal: international recognition of
an obligation upon all governments to prevent private business
firms from closing or restricting access to markets. At least
since the time of the Havana Charter, governments have shown
awareness that consensual arrangements among private firms
are capable of distorting trade. In periodic rounds of negotia-
tions under the GATT, however, they have focused on the pri-
mary task of reducing governmentally-imposed barriers to
trade.
154. Draft Antitrust Code, supra note 15, art. 19, § 1(b)-(c), at S-20.
155. Id. art. 20, § 1, at S-21.
156. The Authority's powers are set forth in Article 19. Id. art. 19, § 2, at S-
20.
157. Id. art. 20, cmt. 1, at S-22.
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As governmentally-imposed barriers have withered and as
tariffs have been reduced dramatically, privately-imposed barri-
ers to trade assume an increasing importance. Some efforts at
market integration have been accompanied by competition laws
ensuring that markets opened by governments are not closed by
private agreements. This was the approach taken in Europe
when the Treaty of Rome created the common market.158 For
the trading world as a whole, however, there is as yet no explicit
set of obligations dealing with competition issues to which all
governments are committed.
The Draft Antitrust Code attempts to identify national obli-
gations whose recognition would further world trade. Unfortu-
nately, the Code is hopelessly flawed in two important ways.
First, ambiguity permeates the provisions of the Code. Perhaps
this ambiguity has increased the Code's acceptability among
lawyers from different nations because they each can read into
these provisions their own presuppositions. That, however,
would be a "legislative mirage, appearing to some [onlookers]
but not to others, and assuming any form desired by the be-
holder."159 Secondly, the Code commits immense and unreview-
able power to the officials charged with administering the Code.
The pervasive ambiguities of the Code further compound the po-
tential for abuse by officials of their delegated power.
The task of writing a universally applicable competition
code is immensely difficult. It is difficult because the nations of
the world exhibit a wide variation on the role which they attri-
bute to governmentally-inspired industrial policy and the role
which they allocate to the unfettered free market. It is difficult
because nations differ widely in their willingness to trust offi-
cials to make socially responsible choices through regulation, as
opposed to market mechanisms. Differences in legal traditions
foster different approaches to the control of competitive
problems. The legal tradition of the United States, for example,
accommodates the incorporation of economic analysis into judi-
cial decision making more easily than does the legal tradition of
continental Europe. 160 Nations which rely heavily upon govern-
mentally inspired industrial policies often employ groups of pri-
vate companies as instruments for carrying out those policies. 161
158. See supra note 1.
159. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 681 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
160. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., MATSUSHITA, supra note 128, at 145.
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Generally the relations among these companies are exempted
from competition law prohibitions. Some nations also pursue
policies expressly designed to favor small and medium size en-
terprises; 162 those policies sometimes result in exclusionary or
market closing effects, especially on foreign companies. More-
over, groups of private companies which control importation or
distribution may exercise their control in ways which can be de-
fended as plausibly furthering industrial policy, as promoting
small and medium sized businesses, or as achieving other recog-
nized societal goals. Consequently, many attempts such as the
Draft Antitrust Code will be necessary before drafters are able
to formulate a set of obligations commanding universal
acceptance.
162. See, e.g., id. at 291.
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PART ONE: GENERAL PROVISIONS AND BASIC
PRINCIPLES
ART. 1: ACCEPTANCE AND ACCESSION
Sec. 1: This Agreement shall be open for acceptance, by sig-
nature or otherwise, by countries contracting parties to the
GATT MTO (Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Or-
ganization) and by the European Community.
Sec. 2: This Agreement shall be open to accession by any
other country, on terms to be agreed between that country and
the CONTRACTING PARTIES to this agreement, by the deposit
with the Director-General of the GATT MTO of an instrument of
accession which states the terms so agreed.
Comments
1. The GATT is the basic framework regulating international
trade with global aspiration. As a result of the Uruguay Round of Mul-
tilateral Trade Negotiations in GATT, the more than 200 GATT and
Uruguay Round Agreements will be integrated into one single new
"Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization" (MTO).
Taking into account that the Havana Charter of 1948, which has never
been brought into effect, included a special section on antitrust law, it
seems to be advisable to combine a new international antitrust regime
with the existing and evolving GATT-MTO system, so as to further the
development of a coherent legal system for international trade.
2. Sec. 1 is based on the final provisions of the Tokyo Round Agree-
ments, known as GATT codes, with a few adjustments in view of the
future MTO Agreement into which an international Antitrust Agree-
ment would have to be integrated.
3. GATT Codes constitute independent agreements in relation to
the General Agreement with distinct, normally limited membership
and distinct executives. The new MTO Agreement will put an end to
the "Code approach," by prescribing that acceptance of the MTO Agree-
ment carries with it acceptance of all GATT and Uruguay Round
Agreements. As part of the new MTO legal system, the International
Antitrust Code will either require acceptance by all MTO member
countries or, preferably, if included into Annex 4 of the MTO Agree-
ment, by a more limited membership (Plurilateral Trade Agreement).
4. A possible alternative to the idea of a GATT Code could have
been the modification of the General Agreement itself, for example by
introducing a new article on antitrust law referring to annex provi-
sions, this annex constituting itself an integral part of the General
Agreement. The Code model or Annex 4 to the MTO Agreement, in-
stead, would leave adherence to the discretion of each Party to the
Agreement. In relation to the General Agreement, membership to the
Antitrust Agreement would be limited.
5. Generally, membership to the GATT should be a prerequisite to
the Antitrust Code membership (Sec. 1). However, adherence must be
open to the European Economic Community which, since 1960, has
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been exercising most GATT rights and GATT obligations and will also
become a full contracting party to the new MTO Agreement.
ART. 2: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT
Sec. 1: Obligation to Implement and to Inform
(a) Any Party to this Agreement undertakes to adopt, in ac-
cordance with its constitution, the measures necessary to ensure
the effective application of this Agreement.
(b) Each Party shall inform the International Antitrust Au-
thority of its existing law at the date of accession and of any
changes in its laws and regulations relevant to this Agreement
and in the administration of such laws and regulations.
Sec. 2: Level of Antitrust Legislation and Non-Discrimination
(a) Each Party to the Agreement is free to provide for and to
apply stricter antitrust rules in its national legislation unless
provided otherwise in the Agreement.
(b) Without prejudice to the obligation under Sec. 1 (a) each
Party to the Agreement shall apply all rules and principles ap-
plicable to national antitrust cases under domestic law immedi-
ately and unconditionally to all interstate antitrust cases within
the scope of this Agreement.
Comments
1. Taking into account the discretion of each Party to the Agreement to
give or not to give self-executing effect to the Code according to its con-
stitutional principles, Sec. 1 (a) does only prescribe the obligation to
bring domestic law and practice into conformity with the provisions of
the Code. These obligations can be fulfilled either by direct transfor-
mation of the Code itself into domestic law, as far as the principle of
self-execution is accepted by the national constitution, or by special
legislation changing the Party's domestic antitrust law.
2. Taking into account the need for an efficient information sys-
tem, Sec. 1 (b) establishes the obligation to inform the International
Antitrust Authority of existing and changing domestic antitrust law
and practice. This information system can be used as the main factual
basis for actions taken by the International Antitrust Authority. Non-
information can be a reason for the International Antitrust Authority
to start the dispute settlement procedure according to Art. 19 Sec. 2 (e).
3. Sec. 2 (a) provides for the principle of minimum protection. The
purpose of the Agreement is to ensure a certain minimum level of anti-
trust protection among Parties to the Agreement within its scope of
application. Therefore, different national antitrust laws will persist.
Parties to the Agreement are free to follow their own antitrust policy
and to provide for stricter rules to combat restraints of competition.
However, in some cases the Agreement provides for a type of maximum
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protection. This is true, for example, in the case of procedural rights of
private parties as alleged initiators of a restraint of competition. Such
provisions have to be respected by the national legislator. Sec. 2 (a)
takes into account this maximum protection saying that the principle
of maximum protection only applies as far as the Agreement does not
provide otherwise.
4. Section 2 (b) provides for a non-discrimination clause specially
tailored to the needs of international antitrust law. Quite often na-
tional antitrust law is limited to mere national antitrust cases. For
example it prohibits only cartels with economic effects in the domestic
market, but allows export cartels. The basic idea of the Agreement is
to establish the same rules for national and transnational competition.
Therefore, national antitrust rules, intended to be applied to national
cases, must also be applied to international cases. This obligation has
to be fulfilled immediately, i.e. from the entry into force of the Agree-
ment, and unconditionally, i.e. without recourse to the principle of reci-
procity. The non-discrimination clause in Sec. 2 (b), moreover, has
important effects when applied together with Sec. 2 (a). Whenever a
Party to the Agreement provides for a higher level of antitrust protec-
tion than necessary according to the Agreement, this level of antitrust
protection has to be respected by that Party to the Agreement indepen-
dently in national and international cases.
ART. 3: SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND JURISDICTION
Sec. 1: Scope of Application
(a) The Agreement shall be applicable to all restraints of
competition in the sense of this Agreement affecting at least two
Parties to the Agreement.
(b) A Party to the Agreement is affected whenever there are
economic effects in its territory or otherwise on its commerce, or
private persons nationals of this Party, or undertakings having
their main commercial establishment on the territory of the
Party, are initiators or victims of a restraint of competition.
Sec. 2: Jurisdiction
Within the scope of application of this Agreement (Sec. 1), a
Party to the Agreement may regulate and may apply its law to
restraints that have economic effects in its territory or otherwise
on its commerce, even if the practice is initiated from outside the
territory, and it may regulate and apply its law to its nationals,
and to all persons who initiate acts from its territory. Parties to
this Agreement are encouraged to extend their law, if it does not
otherwise apply, to restraints of competition that are prohibited
by this Agreement and are initiated from their territory.
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Comments
1. Sec. 1 deals with the delimitation of the Agreement's scope of
application under public international law defining the cases in which
the national legislature has to conform its domestic law to the obliga-
tions stipulated in the Agreement. The rule in Sec. 1 (a) stipulating
that at least two Parties to the Agreement are affected is very general.
It makes clear, that the Agreement shall be applied only to interna-
tional, not mere national, cases. Sec. 1 (b) defines what is meant by
"affected."
2. Sec. 2 provides that nations have jurisdiction to apply their anti-
trust law to conduct that has effects within that nation or on its com-
merce. For example, conclusion abroad of contracts restraining
competition or exclusive involvement of foreign parties in a restraint
are no argument against the application of the law. However, normal
principles of comity might counsel restraint in the application of law or
tailoring of relief in cases of direct conflict with a foreign nation's law
or policy particularly if the conduct is not prohibited by this Agreement
and the restraint is valid and encouraged in the home nation's internal
market and has its most direct effects there.
Section 2 contemplates that nations may apply their law to indi-
viduals or undertakings who initiate violations of the substantive law
in the nation's territory even though the victims or principal victims
are on the territory of another Party and it encourages nations to ex-
tend their law to take account of such harms.
3. Section 2 contemplates that either the injuring nation or the
injured nation may sue and may apply its law. Normally it will seem
appropriate for enforcement to take place in the forum where the prin-
cipal harmful effects occur. National courts will retain their power to
apply foreign antitrust law when appropriate under accepted
principles.
4. As an example of enforcement under Sec. 2, nations whose law
extends to export cartels can usefully enforce their law against their
nationals who, within the nation, conspire to fix and do fix prices of
their exports into another contracting nation. Such enforcement will
tend to deter harmful restraints on competition in transnational mar-
kets. The enforcing nation will profit by general enhancement of com-
petition, by reciprocal efforts of other contracting Parties, and by
protecting against spillover effects in its own market.
PART TWO: HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
ART. 4: HORIzoNTAL RESTRAINTS
Sec. 1: Agreements, understandings and concerted practices
(hereafter "agreements") between or among competitors that fix
prices, divide customers or territories, or assign quotas are
illegal.
Sec. 2: Other agreements between or among competitors are
illegal, if they unreasonably restrict competition. An agreement
restricts competition if its purpose or effect is the lessening of
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competition. Such anticompetitive agreements are presumed to
unreasonably restrict competition, unless justified by:
(1) outbalancing procompetitive effects, or
(2) proof of outbalancing efficiencies or other properties
likely to increase rivalry or inventiveness and to help the collab-
orating firms produce or deliver a better or lower priced product
or service and increase the firms' responsiveness to the needs
and wants of people.
Comments:
1. Intent to lessen competition means the intent to harm competi-
tion by acts not on the competitive merits under conditions in which
there is a probability that such acts may be successfully carried out.
2. The prohibition of Sec. 1 applies to all import, export and inter-
national cartels, as well as to any other cartels that affect commerce.
It is particularly critical that export cartels be included within the
prohibition because export cartels are perpetrated in one nation and
harm individuals and firms in another nation. The exporting nation
may profit by exploitation of foreigners, although the very same con-
duct would not be tolerated if the buyers were domestic firms or citi-
zens. Moreover, the victims of the export cartel may as a practical
matter find it impossible to get relief by attempts to enforce the law of
their own nation because of jurisdictional, discovery and enforcement
problems. The export cartel problem is therefore a prime example of
why an international antitrust regime is necessary, and it is a prime
application of the principle that one may not do to non-nationals what
one is not permitted to do at home.
3. Concerted refusal to deal (boycott) would be illegal under Sec. 1
if it is in aid of an agreement fixing prices, allocating quotas, or divid-
ing customers or territories.
A concerted refusal to deal would be illegal, also, if it is comprised
of competitors attempting to deprive another competitor of sources of
supply, customers, market outlets, or information, facilities, or other
means needed or important to compete.
Agreements among competitors that are not intended to exclude or
handicap a competitor but that have such an effect would be analyzed
under the rule of reason in Sec. 2.
4. While crisis cartels are strongly disfavored, nations may retain
powers to exempt specified private cartel conduct for a limited period of
a crisis when national public policy so demands under condition of
transparency.
ART. 5: VERTICAL RESTRAINTS (DISTRIBUTION STRATEGIES)
Sec. 1: Agreements, concerted practices and restraints in
the course of distribution of products or services are referred to
herein as "distribution strategies."
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Sec. 2: Certain distribution strategies are conclusively pre-
sumed to prevent, restrict or distort competition unreasonably
are illegal, namely:
1. Distribution strategies that aid in the enforcement of
a producer or distributor cartel.
2. Distribution strategies fixing a resale price or price
level.
Sec. 3: Certain distribution strategies presumptively pre-
vent, restrict or distort competition unreasonably and, unless
justified, are illegal:
a. Namely:
i. Distribution strategies preventing or restricting the
free movement of goods or services across national bor-
ders, or discriminating against goods or services of non-
nationals.
ii. Distribution strategies prohibiting discounting or
transshipping.
b. Distribution strategies presumptively illegal may be
justified if and only if the restraint is reasonably necessary
to improve production or distribution and a fair share of the
benefits will be passed on to consumers.
Sec. 4: Exclusive purchasing, exclusive dealing, require-
ment contracts, tying, and other foreclosure restraints are ille-
gal where:
a. They confer or increase market power, or
b. they deny noncontracting persons access on the mer-
its to a significant share of an input or outlet market and
i. the foreclosed persons cannot feasibly procure a
substitute source of supply or outlet, and
ii. the restraint is not justified under the dual re-
quirements: it must be reasonably necessary to improve
production or distribution, and a fair share of the benefits
will be passed on to consumers.
Comments:
1. Distribution strategies include contractual and economic ties
such as vertical price fixing, exclusive arrangements, and the induce-
ment by economic pressure or influence of a supplier or distributor to
behave anticompetitively.
2. Consistent with GATT objectives, this section is based on the
principle that vertical restraints should not be used to inhibit cross-
border transactions.
Additional objectives are: (1) to prevent the use of restraints to en-
hance market power, and (2) to keep markets free and open, with a
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right of sellers to set their own price and a right of competing firms to
have access to markets on the merits.
3. It was considered whether there should be exemptions or special
rules for franchising, pubs, petrol, automobile distribution, and the
like. It was concluded that special rules are not necessary and not
wise. Where restraints are needed to do business efficiently, they will
fall within the provided justifications.
4. Vertical agreements to divide customers, and restricted distri-
bution systems, are not specifically treated. These and all other un-
specified restraints are analyzed under the generic prohibitions.
ART. 6: RESTRAINTS IN CONNECTION WITH INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Sec. 1: Exercise of International Property Rights
(a) The exercise of an international property right within
the limits of the legal content of such right does not entail re-
straints of competition.
(b) Abusing a dominant position by obtaining or exercising
intellectual property rights is prohibited (see Art. 14). Pooling
intellectual property rights to suppress technology or raise
prices is prohibited (see Art. 4).
(c) When the exploitation of an intellectual property right
exceeds the limits of its legal content, any resulting restraint of
competition may be illegal under the provisions of this
Agreement.
Sec. 2: Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights
It is part of the legal content of an intellectual property
right to grant, during the life of the right, licenses which may be
exclusive and territorially restricted and to impose on a licensee
justified obligations and restrictions.
Sec. 3: Know How Licenses
In case of know-how licenses Sec. 2 applies accordingly.
Any obligation on the licensee not to use the licensed know-how
at the end of the license agreement shall not be justified if the
know-how has become public knowledge for any other reason
than a breach of contract committed by the licensee.
Comments:
1. Intellectual property rights in the meaning of this Code are the
rights mentioned in Art. 2 of the Convention establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organisation, signed at Stockholm on 14 July
1967, namely rights relating to
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* literary, artistic and scientific works,
* performances of performing artists, phonograms, and
broadcasts,
" inventions in all fields of human endeavor,
" scientific discoveries,
" industrial designs,
* trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and
designations,
e protection against unfair competition, and all other rights re-
sulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary
or artistic fields.
2. Intellectual property rights constitute elements of a system of
market economy and are, as such, instruments of competition. They
have been protected by international law, e.g., by the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 and the Berne Con-
vention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 (since
then several times revised). Sec. 1 (a) of the Agreement recognizes the
economic function and the legal protection of intellectual property
rights. As a consequence, any obligation or restriction imposed by the
owner of an intellectual property right on the licensee is not objectiona-
ble under a point of view of antitrust as a restraint of competition as
long and inasmuch as such obligation or restriction is covered by the
content of the related intellectual property right. However, intellec-
tual property rights should not be abused for anticompetitive purposes.
3. The following obligations and restrictions are, in particular in
case of patent licenses, accepted as remaining within the legal content
of related intellectual property rights. The list is not exhaustive. It
may be enlarged taking into account the provisions of the applicable
intellectual property legislation:
e an obligation on the licensee to procure goods and services
from a given source, insofar as obtaining such products or services
from that source is necessary for a technically satisfactory exploita-
tion of a licensed invention;
* an obligation on the licensee to pay a minimum royalty or to
produce a minimum quantity of the licensed product or to carry out a
minimum number of operations exploiting the licensed invention;
9 an obligation on the licensee to restrict his exploitation of the
licensed invention to one or more technical fields of application cov-
ered by the licensed patent;
- an obligation on the licensee not to grant sublicenses or assign
the license;
9 an obligation to mark the licensed product or, if applicable,
the service with an indication of the patentee's name, the licensed
patent or the patent licensing agreement;
e an obligation on the licensee not to divulge know-how commu-
nicated by the licensor; the licensee may be held to this obligation
even after the agreement has expired and as long as the know-how
remains secret;
e an obligation to inform the licensor of infringements of the
patent, to take legal action against an infringer, and to assist the
licensor in any legal action against an infringer;
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* an obligation on the licensee to observe specifications concern-
ing the minimum quality of the licensed product which are necessary
for a technically satisfactory exploitation of the licensed invention,
and to allow the licensor to carry out related checks;
9 an obligation on the parties to communicate to one another
any experience gained in exploiting the licensed invention and to
grant one another a non-exclusive license in respect of inventions
relating to improvements and new applications;
• an obligation on the licensor to grant the licensee any more
favourable terms that the licensor may grant to another undertaking
after the agreement is entered into.
4. On the other hand, Sec. 1 (b) makes it clear that the use of intel-
lectual property rights is assessed under certain rules of the Agree-
ment. According to Art. 14, intellectual property rights may not be
used as a means to abuse a dominant position; neither are agreements
allowed that pool intellectual property rights with the intention of sup-
pressing rival technologies (Art. 4).
Moreover, a conduct going beyond the limits of the content of an
intellectual property right may be illegal under the Agreement, Sec. 1
(c).
5. The following obligations and restrictions are, in particular in a
license agreement, deemed to exceed the limits of the legal content of
related intellectual property rights, unless they are found reasonable
in a particular case. The list is not exhaustive. It may be enlarged
taking into account the provisions of the applicable intellectual prop-
erty legislation:
* an obligation not to challenge the validity of the licensed
right;
* an obligation to respect the licensed right even though it may
have expired.
Such an obligation or restriction may be illegal under the provi-
sions of this Agreement.
6. The owner of an intellectual property right who imposes on the
licensee any restriction which is not justified by a clear and unambigu-
ous provision of the applicable intellectual property law or which is not
mentioned in this Agreement carries the burden of proof that the lim-
its of the legal content are not exceeded. The burden of proof that an
action lies under the provisions of this Agreement is on the Authority
(resp. other antitrust plaintiffs).
ART. 7: INDUCING ILLEGAL RESTRAINTS
Undertakings may neither solicit nor inflict disadvantages
upon other undertakings and may not promise or grant advan-
tages to induce them into conduct which according to this Agree-
ment is illegal.
Comments:
This provision contains a necessary supplement for the protection
of competition under this Agreement. It contemplates, by preserving
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independent business behavior, to prevent circumvention of the compe-
tition rules set forth in this Agreement. The text basically resembles
Section 25 Paragraph 2 of the German Act against Restraints of
Competition.
PART THREE: CONTROL OF CONCENTRATION AND
RESTRUCTURING
ART. 8: DEFINITION OF CONCENTRATION
Sec. 1: Acquisition of control
A concentration between undertakings shall be deemed to
arise when one or more undertakings, or one or more persons
already controlling at least one undertaking, acquire, whether
by purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other
means, direct or indirect control of the whole or substantial
parts of one or more other undertakings.
Sec. 2: Exception
A concentration shall not be deemed to arise where credit
institutions or other financial institutions or insurance compa-
nies the normal activities .of which include transactions and
dealings in securities for their own account or for the account of
others, hold on a temporary basis securities which they have ac-
quired in an undertaking with a view to reselling them, provided
that they do not exercise voting rights in respect of those securi-
ties with a view to determining the competitive behavior of that
undertaking.
Comments:
1. The Agreement provides for a special set of rules dealing with
control of concentration including mergers and restructuring. Unlike
cartels which directly restrict competitive behavior, the concentration
of the resources of previously independent enterprises is not bound to
have anticompetitive effects; rather it may provide for economies of
scale or other efficiency gains and may even have procompetitive ef-
fects, because, e.g., it enables the merged enterprise to compete more
effectively vis-h-vis its bigger rivals or to enter into new markets. On
the other hand, concentration of the productive and research capabili-
ties in the hands of one or relatively few enterprises has the potential
to harm competition in the market place, undermine technological pro-
gress and lead to higher prices and costs, bad performance and ineffi-
ciency as well as to supra-competitive profits. Because of this
ambiguity of concentration virtually all legal systems providing for a
competition law distinguish between anticompetitive cartel-like behav-
ior and concentrations, whereas concentrations are evaluated under a
more lenient standard of review than cartels. The Agreement follows
MINN J GzBAi. TRADE [Vol. 6:1
this approach: only concentrations that create or increase the power to
impede effective competition are prohibited. Effective competition
must be created, maintained, and if necessary restored in the markets
for products, services and research and development (see Art. 11 and
13).
2. There are different concepts of defining what constitutes a "con-
centration" as opposed to an anticompetitive coordination of market
behavior. Sec 1 follows the broad concept of control which is, e.g., the
underlying principle of the EC Merger Control Regulation and the
British Fair Trading Act of 1973. The acquisition of control leads to
the establishment of an economic unit and goes beyond a single coordi-
nation of the competitive behavior of independent enterprises.
3. Alternative approaches would be (a) a definition of detailed cri-
teria relating to the different forms of concentration, or (b) covering
any transactions with potential anticompetitive effects. Under the
first concept a number of specific transactions that shall be deemed to
be a "concentration" have to be defined (for example acquisition of as-
sets or shares-in a certain quantity, company affiliation agreements,
interlocking directorates etc.). Since such specific criteria relating to
the forms of concentration, particularly if they are connected with
quantitative thresholds, can easily be circumvented, supplementary
general provisions are necessary. Thus, Germany has recently supple-
mented its specific definition of concentration by general provisions re-
lating to a controlling influence or even to a mere competitively
substantial influence on another enterprise. On the other hand, US-
Antitrust Law abstains from defining of what constitutes a concentra-
tion. Rather, Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act covers acquisitions of any part
of the stock or share capital or any part of the assets of another person.
The only test applied is that for substantive review, i.e., whether such
acquisition may have the effect to substantially lessen competition, un-
less the acquisition is for investments only.
4. The concept of control seems to be preferable: On the one hand,
it is broad and flexible enough to cover all material transactions result-
ing in a concentration and cannot easily be circumvented. On the
other hand, it is not as imprecise and uncertain as the American ap-
proach; the authorities in charge of applying the concentration regula-
tion as well as the undertakings involved are generally able to
determine whether a decisive influence over one undertaking is con-
ferred to the other undertaking.
5. Control may be constituted by rights, contracts or any other
means which, either separately or in combination, legally or factually,
confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertak-
ing, in particular with regard to the use of the assets or the composi-
tion, voting or decisions of the organs of such undertaking. In order to
increase legal certainty for the undertakings involved, the Parties to
the Agreement may introduce such a broad definition of control which
is similar to Art. 3 (3) of the EC-Merger Regulation into their national
antitrust laws.
6. Sec. 1 abstains from specifying any minimum thresholds such as
a specific percentage of shares or voting capital necessary to establish
control. While control will always exist where a majority of voting
shares are acquired, it may also be established below 50 percent of the
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voting capital, if e.g., the rest of the shares are widely dispersed. In
this regard, the national law may introduce certain rules of presump-
tion that, e.g., an acquisition of 35 or 40 percent of the shares is usually
sufficient to confer control. The presumption, however, does not ex-
clude the possibility that control is acquired with a shareholding below
the threshold figure.
7. Joint ventures between two or more undertakings can be a
means of coordinating the business activities of the participants in a
certain field or region. Alternatively, a joint venture may constitute a
concentration, if it leads to a. lasting change in the structures of the
participating enterprises and a new economic unit on the market. In
order to be concentrative, a joint venture must perform on a lasting
basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity and must not
give rise to coordination of the competitive behavior of the parties
among themselves. The distinction between cooperative and concen-
trative joint ventures is controversial and the practice of the EC-Com-
mission appears inconsistent. The notice of the Commission related to
this distinction had not been followed strictly (OJ C 203, 14.8.1990, p.
10). A new notice has been issued by the Commission concerning coop-
erative joint ventures (OJ C 43, 16.2.1993). The distinction will re-
quire further clarification by the Commission.
8. Sec. 2 clarifies that normal transactions and dealings in securi-
ties by credit institutions, other financial institutions or insurance
companies do not constitute a concentration, as long as they do not
exercise voting rights in order to influence the competitive behavior of
the undertaking concerned. The wording is influenced by Art. 3 (5)(a)
of the EC-Merger Regulation without implementing all details of that
provision. The Parties to this Agreement are free to introduce further
clarifications into their national law if necessary to prevent application
of merger control provisions to legal institutions that possibly confer
decisive influence over an undertaking on certain persons, but do not
affect the market structure and competitive situation in the relevant
market.
ART. 9: SCOPE OF APPLICATION
Sec. 1: International Dimension
(a) This Agreement shall apply to concentrations with an in-
ternational dimension, provided the threshold turnover require-
ments set forth in Sec. 2 of this Article are fulfilled.
(b) For the purposes of this Agreement, a concentration has
an international dimension whenever the requirements of Art. 3
Sec. 1 are met.
Sec. 2: Threshold Turnover Requirements
(a) Concentrations shall be deemed not to have an interna-
tional dimension where
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(1) the aggregate worldwide turnover of all the under-
takings concerned is less than 0.1 percent of the Gross Na-
tional Product of the Party affected by the concentration, or
(2) more than 90 per cent of the aggregate worldwide
turnover of all the undertakings concerned is made outside
the territory of the Party affected by the concentration.
(b) Aggregate turnover within the meaning of paragraph (a)
above shall comprise the amounts derived by the undertakings
concerned in the preceding financial year from the sale of prod-
ucts and the provision of services falling within the undertak-
ings' ordinary activities after deduction of sales rebates and
value added tax and other taxes directly related to turnover.
Further details on the calculation of the aggregate turnover of
an undertaking concerned may be established by the national
law of the Parties to the Agreement.
Comments:
1. In accordance with the general provision regarding the Agree-
ment's scope of application (Art. 3, Sec. 1), the application of the Agree-
ment's concentration control regulation is restricted to concentrations
with an international dimension. Sec. 1 (b) adopts the general rule to
the specific situation in the case of concentrations.
2. In addition, the threshold turnover requirements are intended
to limit the application of the concentration control provisions to signif-
icant structural changes the impact of which on the market goes be-
yond the national borders of any Party to the Agreement.
3. Details on the calculation of the aggregate turnover are left to
national law. These include, inter alia, rules on the exclusion of inter-
company sales within the group of undertakings to which the under-
taking concerned belongs, the definition of such group of companies the
external turnover of which is to be added to the turnover of the under-
taking concerned, the possible modification or substitution of the turn-
over criterion in case of insurance companies, credit or other financial
institutions. Art. 5 of the EC-Merger Regulation contains an example
of a detailed provision regarding the calculation of turnover.
ART. 10: PRIOR NOTIFICATION AND SUSPENSION OF
CONCENTRATIONS
Sec. 1: Prior Notification
(a) Concentrations with an international dimension as de-
fined in this Agreement shall be notified to each National Anti-
trust Authority of the Party or Parties affected. The notification
shall be made prior to the intended transaction's becoming effec-
tive which would confer control on the acquirer.
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(b) In addition, concentrations which are to be notified to
the National Antitrust Authority of two or more Parties accord-
ing to paragraph (a) shall be notified to the International Anti-
trust Authority.
(c) The notification according to paragraph (a) shall be ef-
fected by the person or undertaking acquiring control of the
whole or substantial parts of one or more undertakings. The
Parties to this Agreement shall establish in their national law
details of the information to be given in the notification in ac-
cordance with a standardized form for notification and request
of information to be used by the International Antitrust
Authority.
(d) The notification according to paragraph (b) shall be ef-
fected by the National Antitrust Authorities of the Parties hav-
ing received a notification according to paragraph (a) within one
week after receipt of such notification.
Sec. 2: Suspension of Concentrations
(a) A concentration with an international dimension as de-
fined in this Agreement shall not be put into effect before its no-
tification and within a period of three months following its
notification.
(b) The National Antitrust Authority may extend the sus-
pension period for another period of up to three months, if it is
not able to take a decision on the notified concentration accord-
ing to Art. 11, e.g., because further investigation is necessary.
In cases in which more than one National Antitrust Authority is
concerned with the matter (Sec. 1), the extension of the suspen-
sion period ordered by one National Antitrust Authority auto-
matically extends to the concentration or concentrations
pending before another or other National Antitrust Authorities.
The time limits mentioned in (a) and (b) shall commence on the
day following that of the receipt of a notification or, if the infor-
mation to be supplied with the notification is incomplete, on the
day following that of the receipt of the complete information.
(c) Within the period of three months following the notifica-
tion according to paragraph (a) or within the extended period
granted under paragraph (b), the National Antitrust Authority
may, on request, grant a derogation from suspension of a con-
centration according to paragraph (a) in order to prevent serious
damage to one or more undertakings concerned by a concentra-
tion or to a third party. The derogation may be made subject to
conditions and obligations in order to ensure conditions of effec-
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tive competition. In cases in which more than one National An-
titrust Authority is concerned with the matter, the derogation,
its conditions and obligations require the consent of all National
Antitrust Authorities involved (Sec. 1 (a)).
(d) Any transaction carried out in contravention to para-
graph (a) above shall be invalid, unless a derogation is granted
pursuant to paragraph (c) or a decision pursuant to Art. 11 Sec.
3 is issued.
Sec 3: Rights of the International Antitrust Authority
In cases where the International Antitrust Authority has
been notified according to Sec. 1 above, it may give recommenda-
tions to the National Antitrust Authorities of the Parties af-
fected and exercise its rights of intervention pursuant to Art. 19,
Sec. 2. However, as far as proceedings against private persons
and undertakings involved in the concentration are concerned, it
may exercise its rights only within the time limits set forth in
the respective national law.
Comments:
1. Art. 10 provides for mandatory pre-merger notification and a
limited waiting period for implementation of concentrations. This is in
line with the EC-Merger Regulation as well as with modern antitrust
provisions which were introduced, inter alia, in the USA and Germany
during the past two decades.
2. Other jurisdictions, e.g., France and the U.K, do not require a
notification of concentrations to the competent authorities at all.
Rather, they rely on publicly available information about important
concentrations and on the self-interest of the parties who usually want
to get their transaction cleared by the authorities within reasonable
time and therefore will often make an optional notification even prior
to the transaction intended. If no public information was available on
the transaction and no notification was filed, then the time-limit for a
review of the transaction does not begin to run.
3. However, it may be difficult for the competent authorities to
identify concentrations that fall under the scope of the concentration
regulation, particularly in an international context involving under-
takings from different countries. Since a restructuring (Art. 13) may
be difficult after the concentration has been effected, the authorities
should be in a position to prevent important anticompetitive transac-
tions even before they have been executed. Therefore, a waiting period
is introduced during which the parties may not proceed with their in-
tended transactions.
4. In addition, Sec. 2 (c) enables the National Antitrust Authority
to grant a derogation from the suspension of the concentration in ex-
ceptional cases. In cases of multiple notifications (diversity cases), this
grant automatically extends to other jurisdictions concerned. On the
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other hand, derogations from suspension, granted by one National An-
titrust Authority, need be supported by parallel decisions, in diversity
cases, by all other National Antitrust Authorities concerned in order to
prevent discrepancies with respect to the legal eistence of a concen-
tration in different jurisdictions ("limping mergers").
5. Art. 10 does not provide for any post-merger notification which
would mainly serve statistical purposes. The Parties to the Agreement
may however supplement their national antitrust laws by introducing
provisions for post-merger notification in addition to the mandatory
rules for prior notification.
6. The information to be given in the pre-merger notification shall
include all details necessary to enable the National Antitrust Author-
ity to appraise the concentration. The information ought to include,
inter alia, a description of the nature of the concentration being noti-
fied (acquisition of assets, shares etc.), information on the economic
sectors involved, market shares and other details on the Parties to the
concentration (turnover, number of employees, lists of all undertakings
belonging to the same group etc.).
7. Sec. 3 limits the general rights of intervention of the Interna-
tional Antitrust Authority under Art. 10 Sec. 2 to the time limits speci-
fied by national law, as far as proceedings against private parties to
the concentration are concerned, because the parties to the merger
shall be able to filly rely on such time limits for intervention against
the merger.
8. Problems of confidentiality shall be resolved before implementa-
tion of notification pursuant to Sec. 1.
ART. 11: APPRAISAL OF CONCENTRATIONS
Sec. 1: Power to Impede Effective Competition
(a) A concentration which creates or increases the power of
one or more undertakings concerned, either separately or
jointly, to impede effective competition in the relevant market,
shall be prohibited by the National Antitrust Authority.
(b) In making its appraisal, the National Antitrust Author-
ity shall take into account all relevant competitive factors, in
particular:
(1) the competitive structure of all the markets con-
cerned, including the actual or potential competition from
undertakings located either within or outside the territory
of the National Antitrust Authority;
(2) the market position of the undertakings concerned
and their economic and financial power, the alternatives
available to suppliers and users, their access to supplies or
markets, any legal or other barriers to entry as well as sup-
ply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services.
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Sec. 2: Conditions for Granting a Permission
(a) Where the National Antitrust Authority finds, that a
concentration does not fulfill the criterion laid down in Sec. 1 (a),
it shall issue a decision declaring that the concentration is
permitted.
(b) Where the National Antitrust Authority finds that, fol-
lowing modifications by the undertakings concerned, a notified
concentration does not fulfill the criterion laid down in Sec. 1 (a),
it shall issue a decision declaring that the concentration is per-
mitted and shall attach to its decision any conditions and obliga-
tions that in its opinion are reasonably necessary to ensure that
the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they
have entered into vis-&-vis the National Antitrust Authority
with a view to modifying the original concentration plan. The
decision declaring the concentration permitted shall also cover
restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementa-
tion of the concentration. The conditions and obligations at-
tached to the National Antitrust Authority's decision may not be
directed at placing the conduct of the undertakings concerned
under continuous supervision.
Sec. 3: Decision of Nonviolation
If the National Antitrust Authority concludes that the con-
centration notified does not fall within the scope of this Agree-
ment or does not raise reasonable concerns as to its
compatibility with Sec. 1, it shall as soon as possible issue to the
notifying person or undertaking a written decision declaring
that the intended concentration does not violate Art. 11 and
therefore may be implemented.
Sec. 4: Diversity Cases
In cases in which more than one National Antitrust Author-
ity is concerned with the matter, decisions under this article re-
quire consent of all National Antitrust Authorities concerned.
Failing such consent, the National Antitrust Authorities will de-
cide in conformity with an instruction to decide issued by the
International Antitrust Authority. The International Antitrust
Authority, taking into account the public interests asserted by
the Parties involved and the economic effects on the interna-
tional market, has the right to issue this instruction to decide
during the last month of the periods provided for in Art. 10 Sec.
2 (a) (suspension period) or (b) (extended suspension period). If
the instruction to decide is issued and served to all National An-
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titrust Authorities concerned (Art. 10 Sec. 1) within that last
month of either period, the suspensions under Sec. 2 (a) or (b) is
extended in all jurisdictions concerned to the day on which the
last prohibition, permission, or nonviolation decision under this
Article is made by a National Antitrust Authority concerned and
served to the persons or undertakings mentioned in Art. 10 Sec.
1 (c).
Comments:
1. The legitimate objective of a control of concentration in the
framework of GATT ought to be the preservation of competitive market
structures. The implementation of a national industrial policy by way
of merger control is likely to raise conflicts with the policy of other
states and would possibly jeopardize free international trade. Because
of the ambiguity of concentration (and the different level of economic
development achieved in different regions of the world) the control of
concentrations should concentrate on clearly anticompetitive effects,
i.e., on the prevention of monopolistic situations and tight oligopolies.
Therefore, Sec. 1 requires a considerably higher degree of anticompeti-
tive effects for prohibition of a concentration than in the case of cartel-
like behavior.
2. The criterion for intervention is the power to impede effective
competition. The creation of such power marks a qualitative change in
the competitive situation of a market. In comparison to the more static
concept of market domination the criterion of "power to impede effec-
tive competition" places more emphasis on the resources and future
possibilities of the undertaking concerned to act appreciably independ-
ent from its competitors and/or customers than the more static concept
of market domination. The criterion is fulfilled where the concentra-
tion leads to a situation in which the undertakings concerned are put
into a position where they are able to determine prices, to control or
restrict production or distribution or to hinder otherwise effective com-
petition in a substantial part of the market (see a also Art. 66 ECSC).
The criterion is applicable to oligopoly situations, too.
3. Sec. 1 (b) lists the most important factors to be taken into ac-
count in making the appraisal whether the concentration creates or
increases the power to impede effective competition. In the end, a con-
clusive assessment of the overall competitive effect of the concentration
is to be made. Part of this assessment should be, similar to a rule of
reason, the balancing of competitive advantages and disadvantages on
different markets affected by the concentration. This appraisal is
strictly limited to the evaluation of the competitive effects of the con-
centration in question. Considerations of industrial policy must only
be taken into account with regard to a possible justification of concen-
trations according to Art. 12 Sec. 1.
4. Sec. 2 (a) imposes on the National Antitrust Authorities the obli-
gation to permit the concentration if the criterion laid down in Art. 11
Sec 1 (a) is not fulfilled in order to increase legal certainty for the un-
dertakings concerned. Sec. 2(b) enables the National Antitrust Au-
thorities to react flexibly on proposed transactions, as they may impose
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conditions and obligations on the granting of a permission for the
merger. This provision is closely related to Art. 8 (2) of the EC-Merger
Regulation.
5. The mandatory pre-merger notification and particularly the sus-
pension of intended concentrations may place a heavy burden on the
enterprises involved and considerably delay even economic useful
transactions. Therefore, Sec. 3 imposes the obligation on the National
Antitrust Authority to reduce the waiting period in case no competitive
concern is likely to be established.
6. Sec. 4 takes care of the diversity cases. Since the concentration
affects more than one jurisdiction, the National Antitrust Authorities
have to decide unanimously. If they cannot agree, the right to decide
must be vested in the International Antitrust Authority. It may issue
a binding instruction to decide to the National Antitrust Authorities
during the last month of suspension or extended suspension (Art. 10
Sec. 2 (a) or (b)).
ART. 12: EXCEPTIONS
Sec. 1: Justification of Concentrations
A concentration that fulfils the criterion laid down in Art. 11
Sec. 1 (a) may nevertheless be permitted, if in the individual
case the restraint of competition resulting from the concentra-
tion is justified by overwhelming public interests of the Parties
to the Agreement affected and does not unreasonably harm the
legitimate interests of other affected Parties.
Sec. 2: Authorities and Procedure for Granting Permission on
Grounds of Overwhelming Public Interest
(a) Each Party to the Agreement shall designate a public
body competent for the granting of permission for the concentra-
tion on the grounds of overwhelming public interest. This public
body must be different from the National Antitrust Authority.
In diversity cases, Art. il Sec. 4 applies accordingly.
(b) The application for the granting of permission shall be
submitted to the public body mentioned in paragraph (a) in writ-
ing within a certain period.
(c) The public body designated by the Party to the Agree-
ment concerned shall decide on the application within three
months following the expiration of the periods for the applica-
tion for permission referred to in paragraph (b). Prior thereto,
the International Antitrust Authority shall be given opportunity
for comment, if the concentration had to be notified to the Inter-
national Antitrust Authority according to Art. 10 Sec. 1 (b).
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(d) The permission may be subjected to conditions and obli-
gations. These may not be directed at placing the conduct of the
undertakings concerned under continuous supervision.
Comments:
1. Art. 12 provides for the introduction of certain political consider-
ations in a separate proceeding before a different authority. A concen-
tration prohibited by the National Antitrust Authority under purely
competitive aspects may nevertheless be permitted, on application, if
the restraint of competition is justified by overwhelming public inter-
ests of the Party affected by the concentration.
2. It is necessary to establish a second stage of review in which the
participating parties can apply for an exception on the basis of political
reasoning. However, the criteria for a possible justification of anticom-
petitive concentrations must be very limited and generally acknowl-
edged, because otherwise protection of competitive market structures
would be put into question; and the basic assumption of all competition
laws is that competition itself is generally the best means for improv-
ing "social and economic welfare." Therefore, the criteria for a possible
justification of anticompetitive concentrations on political reasons
ought to be restricted to overwhelming general public interests.
3. In making this appraisal, only such advantages of the concen-
tration may be taken into account that could not be achieved without
the concentration or by means which have less anticompetitive effects.
In addition, any economic advantages must be real economies as a con-
sequence of productive efficiencies or technological progress. Such eco-
nomic advantages as well as any other benefits resulting from the
concentration with regard to the pursuing of overriding public policy
goals must be so substantial that the disadvantages resulting from the
restriction of competition are fully compensated. A justification of the
concentration is not possible if the scope of the restraint of competition
would endanger the principle of market economy in the relevant
market.
Moreover, in determining whether the concentration is justified by
overwhelming public interests, legitimate interests of other affected
Parties to the Agreement must be taken into account to the extent that
such interests may not unreasonably be harmed by permitting the con-
centration. This approach on the level of substantive law significantly
reduces the potential for international conflicts. Nevertheless, when-
ever disputes between Parties to the Agreement arise, the Interna-
tional Antitrust Authority will issue an instruction to decide to the
relevant public bodies of the Parties concerned.
4. The period for submitting an application to the public body to be
designated by the Parties to the Agreement should'be reasonably short
(e.g., one month). The national law ought to provide for further details,
e.g., that the period shall commence with the service of the decision of
the National Antitrust Authority prohibiting the concentration in ac-
cordance with Art. 11 Sec. 1 (a). If this decision is appealed, then the
period for application should commence on the date on which the deci-
sion becomes unappealable.
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ART. 13: RESTRUCTURING
Sec. 1: Restructuring Order
If in non-competitive, highly concentrated markets the mar-
ket structure induces persistent abuses involving the exercise of
significant market power adversely affecting at least one other
Party the National Antitrust Authority shall order the restruc-
turing of the undertaking. The order must be preceded by
sectoral investigations, to which the National Antitrust Author-
ity must be empowered by national law.
Sec. 2: Exceptions
(a) There shall be no recourse to a restructuring order if in a
specific case restructuring would involve disadvantages of the
economy as such outweighing the benefits in terms of competi-
tion, or if the order would adversely affect overwhelming public
interests.
(b) A restructuring order shall be restricted in a way to
achieve its objectives with the least cost and effort. The restruc-
turing order can be linked with conditions and obligations, pro-
vided that the undertakings concerned are not subjected to
continuous supervision of their business conduct.
Sec. 3: Diversity Cases
Art. 11 Sec. 4 sentences 1 and 2 apply accordingly.
Comments:
1. Restructuring is the most serious instrument of competition pol-
icy. An intervention into corporate structures to reestablish competi-
tion should be applied only under exceptional conditions. Criteria of a
market structure are essential when examining whether measures of
restructuring are necessary. The degree of concentration must be
higher than the thresholds of merger control. Furthermore, the dura-
tion of concentration should be considered. Structural criteria as such
may reveal anticompetitive industries. But to order restructuring, det-
rimental conduct on markets resulting from concentration should indi-
cate whether an intervention is required. Therefore, the need for
restructuring will primarily be demonstrated by showing that the spe-
cific conduct has structural causes which can only be removed by re-
structuring. Structural conditions are obviously conducive to an
abusive conduct if general business objectives, such as profits, growth,
inventiveness, research and development incentives, and risk reduc-
tion, can be best achieved via anticompetitive practices.
2. Restructuring cannot be ordered if the effects on competition are
outweighed by general economic disadvantages or by overwhelming
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public interest. Therefore, any order of restructuring should be ef-
fected by the National Antitrust Authority only.
3. Before issuing an order of restructuring, a thorough investiga-
tion into the competitive situation should be effected extending into
markets which could provide substitutes for the products of the sector
considered for restructuring. Such sectoral investigations, which are
designed to determine whether restructuring measures are in fact ap-
propriate, should be conducted by the National Antitrust Authority.
4. Sec. 2 (b) addressed the principle of proportionality. The prac-
tice of providing for conditions and obligations in merger cases has
proved to be useful in national concentration control laws. It should be
used in restructuring cases, too.
PART FOUR: ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION
ART. 14: ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant posi-
tion shall be prohibited in so far as it may adversely affect com-
petition in any market. Such abuse may, in particular, consist
in
(a) limiting production, markets or technical develop-
ment to the prejudice of consumers;
(b) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transac-
tions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(c) making the conclusion of contracts subject to accept-
ance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Comments:
1. Competition law has, as a rule, to accept the existence of market
dominating firms. However, the competitive pressure for those under-
takings being absent, law substitutes this pressure and controls the
firms' market behavior. This market behavior may be detrimental in
view of buyers or sellers. Furthermore, the behavior of the market
dominating firm may be directed against remaining competitors. Art.
14 provides for a control of the existing market power.
2. The proposed text is partly an adoption of Article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome. Art. 86 provides several examples of abuses the first
of which addresses exploitative behavior in form of excessive pricing.
Further examples refer to exclusionary strategies of dominant firms
with anticompetitive effects.
3. To interfere with an undertaking's price policies might easily
result in price controls. This is not to be considered an objective of
competition law. Its rules should be directed against anticompetitive
exclusionary strategies by firms with considerable market power but
not against the firms' market performance. Therefore, the reference in
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Article 86 EEC Treaty to exploitative behavior in form of excessive
pricing has been omitted. As far as exclusionary behavior is concerned
the application of Article 14 follows established administrative and
court practice to Art. 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
4. In some cases a dominant firm might engage in behavior that
could appear to offend Art. 14 but that is undertaken to produce a bet-
ter product or service, to produce more output, to distribute the prod-
uct or service by a better or lower cost means, or otherwise to respond
to demand. It is contemplated that behavior will not constitute an
abuse under this Article if the dominant firm proves that the negative
effects of the conduct are outbalanced by procompetitive effects, or by
efficiencies or technological progress likely to enure to the market as a
whole, with consumers deriving a fair share of the benefits.
PART FIVE: REMEDIES
ART. 15: REMEDIES
Sec. 1: Remedies under the Agreement and Other Remedies
(a) National law must provide for the following remedies:
Injunctive relief, fines, disgorgement of profits, damages, and
publication of judgment.
(b) National law may provide for additional remedies such
as apology, warning, imprisonment, multiple damages, punitive
damages, suspension of or closing down the business of the vio-
lator, etc.
(c) National law will determine the competent authorities
for remedial action.
Sec. 2: Injunctive Relief
Injunctive relief consists in one or more of the following
orders:
" to cease the violation
" to desist from further violation
" to induce the violator to take corrective action
" to take appropriate steps for corrective action to re-
store competition, independent from the cooperation of the
violator.
Sec. 3: Fines
. (a) A person who violates any provision of the Agreement
will be fined.
(b) In the event a representative, agent, employee or any
other person committing a violation of this Agreement hereby
acts for a legal or natural person or for a business association,
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this legal or natural person or business association shall also be
subject to a fine. This fine may be multiple of the fine referred to
under (a).
Sec. 4: Disgorgement or Restitution of Profits
In the event of an infringement of a provision of this Agree-
ment the national authority will order the undertakings in-
volved to pay the profits drawn from such infringements to the
public treasury, the victims, or otherwise.
Sec. 5: Set-Offs
National law may provide for adequate set-offs with respect
to the amounts of fines and disgorgement due under Secs. 3 and
4.
Sec. 6: Damages
(a) An undertaking which infringes upon the rights or inter-
ests of another person, competitor, consumer, or other, as a re-
sult of a violation of this Agreement shall be liable for damages
arising therefrom.
(b) If an undertaking violates any provision of this Agree-
ment and infringes upon another person's rights or interests,
the injured party may petition to eliminate such infringement.
If there is a likelihood of an infringement, the party may petition
for prevention thereof. Such redress or prevention of an in-
fringement does not require intent or negligence.
Sec. 7: Publication of Judgment
When an injured party institutes a lawsuit in accordance
with this Article, it may request for publishing the results of the
final judgment in two newspapers at the infringing party's
expense.
Sec. 8: International Antitrust Authority
If the national authority delays or refuses to take remedial
action under this Agreement, any Party to this Agreement may
submit the matter to the International Antitrust Authority men-
tioned in Art. 19 of this Agreement.
Sec. 9: Diversity Cases
If injunctive relief requires the consent of more than one na-
tional authority absent such consent the national authorities
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will decide in conformity with an instruction to decide issued by
the International Antitrust Authority (Art. 19). The national
authority that holds that a certain order of injunctive relief is-
sued by another national authority should have needed consent,
will notify the International Antitrust Authority. The decision
in conformity with the instruction to decide replaces the earlier
decisions of national authorities in that matter.
Comments:
1. Antitrust laws must be enforceable. Antitrust remedies involve
administrative, punitive, and private law sanctions. With regard to
remedies, national laws for the protection of competition vary greatly.
Hence, the Agreement can only indicate some basic concepts and must
leave all details to the national legislators. This refers to questions
such as whether one or several remedies shall be applied in the partic-
ular case, the amount of fines, single or treble damages, the require-
ment of an apology, and other remedial issues.
2. The general guideline to be followed ought to be that doing
wrong should not pay. The remedy or remedies must at any rate out-
weigh the possible profits drawn from the violation of the law.
3. Sec. 5 provides for the set-off of fines levied by more than one
national authority, and when fines and disgorgement of profits concur
in the particular case. This corresponds to EC practice.
4. If a national authority refuses to take remedial action, the way
is open to the International Antitrust Authority (Art. 19 of the Agree-
ment), Sec. 8.
5. Sec. 9 corresponds to Art. 11 Sec. 4 (diversity cases).
6. Investigative action and its remedies are regulated in Art. 17
Sec. 3 of the Agreement.
PART SIX: PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS AND STATE
AUTHORIZATION
ART. 16: PUBLIC UNDERTAKINGS AND STATE AUTHORIZATION
Sec. 1: Public undertakings, irrespective of their legal sta-
tus, are subject to the applications of this Agreement as far as
they engage in economic activities that could be carried out by
private undertakings. Undertakings entrusted with the opera-
tion of services of general economic interest or having the char-
acter of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the
rules contained in this Agreement in so far as the application of
such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of
the particular tasks assigned to them.
Sec. 2: State authorization is no defence against an alleged
violation of this Agreement as far as direct effects on the terri-
tory of another Party to this Agreement are concerned.
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Comments:
Art. 16 is the basis of the Agreement's application in the public
sphere. Public undertakings are defined as "engagement in economic
activities that could be carried out by private undertakings." An ex-
emption clause for services of general economic interest or for under-
takings having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly similar
to Art. 90 Sec. 2 Phrase 1 EEC-Treaty seems indispensable. In view of
the cases decided by the Court of the European Communities to Art. 90
Sec. 2 EEC-Treaty, it should be emphasized that this exemption covers
only restraints of competition that are appropriate, indispensable and
proportional to meet the public purpose. Restraints of competition pro-
mote public purposes only under rare circumstances. Therefore, the
exemption clause has to be interpreted restrictively.
PART SEVEN: INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
ART. 17: NATIONAL ANTITRUST AUTHORITIES
Sec. 1: Institution of National Antitrust Authorities (NAA)
(a) Each Party to the Agreement shall establish a national
antitrust authority for its own territory. Within regional eco-
nomic organizations, being themselves Party to the Agreement,
a centralized antitrust authority and persisting national anti-
trust authorities of member states shall be understood equally
as national antitrust authorities in the sense of this Agreement.
(b) Political independence of the national antitrust author-
ity shall be guaranteed by the domestic law of the Party to the
Agreement especially embracing as far as this Agreement does
not provide otherwise, exclusive competence of the national anti-
trust authority within the scope of application of this Agreement
and autonomy of the national antitrust authority in all decisions
relating to its staff.
(c) Each Party to the Agreement shall ensure a sufficient
budget guaranteeing effective functioning of the national anti-
trust authority.
Sec. 2: Investigative Powers of the National Antitrust
Authority
In order to enable the national antitrust authority to meet
its obligations to investigate whether an undertaking violates a
provision of this Agreement, the Authority should have the
power to issue an order directed against the undertaking and
other relevant parties to accept an investigation, to make state-
ments, to produce the necessary evidence, to submit relevant ac-
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count books and other relevant evidence. Sanctions shall be
provided for false compliance or non-compliance.
Sec. 3: Proceedings Before National Antitrust Authorities:
Judicial Protection Against National Antitrust
Authorities
(a) Applying this Agreement and within their jurisdiction
(Art. 3 Sec. 3) national antitrust authorities will respect all
human, civil and procedural rights of the person or undertaking
directly concerned according to the Rule of Law and internation-
ally agreed standards.
(b) Any person or undertaking, directly affected by a re-
straint of competition prohibited under this Agreement, shall
have a right to request the competent national antitrust author-
ities to take appropriate measures against individual restraints
of competition.
(c) Any person or undertaking directly concerned by a re-
fusal of a national antitrust authority to take appropriate meas-
ures against individual restraints of competition prohibited by
this Agreement or concerned by sanctions and procedures initi-
ated by the national antitrust authority in application of this
Agreement shall have a right to start an action against the au-
thority. National law shall guarantee the necessary indepen-
dence of the competent law court and of its legal proceedings
respecting the Rule of Law.
Comments:
1. Taking into account the need to enforce the provisions of the
Agreement in the framework of domestic law, the institution of na-
tional antitrust authorities in all states accepting the Agreement is a
necessity. Art. 17 Sec. 1 refers to the establishment and the status of
the national antitrust authority. In addition public bodies in the sense
of Art. 12 Sec. 2 and national authorities in the sense of Art. 15 will
have to be established.
a) Sec. 1 (a) contains two basic principles:
(1.) The national antitrust authority must be independent. The
notion of independence is clarified in Sec. 1 (b);
(2.) There must be at least one antitrust authority which is com-
petent for a given territory. Parties to the Agreement which have or
wish to establish more than one antitrust authority competent for
the application of their national law, shall designate one of such au-
thorities as the National Antitrust Authority for purposes of this
Agreement. The second sentence of Sec. 1 (a) takes into account the
situation in regional economic organizations, e.g., the European
Community, with a central antitrust authority. In such a case, the
Agreement does not prohibit a system of combined centralized and
[Vol. 6:1
1997] EPLoRING THE RELATiON BETWEEN TREATIEs 59
national antitrust administrations. Centralized and national au-
thorities must respect the rules provided for by the Agreement, the
relation between central and national authorities being exclusively
regulated by the regional organization's own constitution.
b) Sec. 1 (b) provides for some principles guaranteeing the author-
ity's political independence. As far as the Agreement has to be applied,
domestic political influence must be limited. Sec. 1 (b) restricts itself to
some basic ideas, leaving the final constitution of the authority to the
discretion of the national legislator. The authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction in the application of the Agreement, especially excluding
political antitrust decisions of the national government. Exceptions,
however, seem to be possible in specific fields, such as a combined deci-
sion-making procedure including the antitrust authority and the public
body in concentration cases. Nevertheless exceptions to the general
rule of exclusive jurisdiction should only be permitted as far as they
are provided for by the Agreement, for example in Art. 12 Sec. 2. Per-
sonal independence of the chief executive of the authority and the staff
from the government are essential.
2. Sec. 3 contains special rules referring to the proceedings to be
applied in the national antitrust administration and to the judicial pro-
tection of private persons against acts of the authority.
a) Sec. 3 (a) refers to the proceedings applied by the authority in
administering the Agreement. In doing so, Sec. 3 (a) contains proce-
dural guarantees for the person or undertaking concerned. Although
working in the interest of private persons, the respect of individual,
human, civil, and procedural rights, at the same time, works as a mis-
use principle in the public interest. Only fair proceedings based on the
Rule of Law and the respect of individual rights can guarantee a well
functioning of the antitrust administration, free of errors and intended
misuse. Both, individual protection of the person concerned and the
said public interest, can be regarded as a form of maximum protection
of internationally agreed principles of antitrust law. Human, civil, and
procedural rights can be taken, above all, from the national constitu-
tion. The general principle of the Rule of Law requires likewise the
respect of individual rights in the field of antitrust law. Internation-
ally agreed standards can be found especially in Human Rights Con-
ventions, such as the European Convention on Human Rights.
b) Supplementing Sec. 3 (a), Sec. 3 (b) provides for a judicial proce-
dure initiated by the person or entity concerned against the national
antitrust authority. Similarly, the applied judicial proceedings and the
status of the court must be shaped accordingly on the basis of the Rule
of Law and judicial independence.
ART. 18: CONTRACTING PARTIES
Representatives of the Parties to the Agreement shall meet
from time to time for the purpose of giving effect to those provi-
sions of this Agreement which involve joint action, especially
promoting further development of the Agreement. Wherever
reference is made in this Agreement to the Parties of the Agree-
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ment acting jointly they are designated as the CONTRACTING
PARTIES.
Comments:
Art. 18 defines the CONTRACTING PARTIES as the first body
within the Agreement's administration. Consisting of representatives
of the Parties to the Agreement, it is very much a political body,
whereas the International Antitrust Authority (infra Art. 19) is an ex-
clusively international and independent administrative body. Art. 18
follows the example of Art. XXV:1 GATT. However, special reference is
made to the CONTRACTING PARTIES' main function to promote fur-
ther development of this Agreement.
ART. 19: THE INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST AuTHORITY
Sec. 1: Institution of the International Antitrust Authority
(IAA)
(a) The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall establish an Inter-
national Antitrust Authority and agree on a Statute of the Au-
thority. The International Antitrust Authority shall be headed
by a President and an International Antitrust Council. The In-
ternational Antitrust Authority shall operate within the institu-
tional framework of the GATT (MTO).
(b) The President of the International Antitrust Authority
will be appointed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on a non-
renewable term of six years. The President shall be experienced
in the field of national or international antitrust law. The re-
sponsibilities of the President and of the staff of the Interna-
tional Antitrust Authority shall be exclusively international in
character. In the discharge of their duties, they shall not seek or
accept instructions from any government. The International
Antitrust Authority shall enjoy in the territory of each of its
members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for
the exercise of its functions.
(c) The President will be assisted by the International Anti-
trust Council, consisting of twenty members. The appointment
and legal status of the members of the Council correspond to the
appointment and legal status of the President. A member of the
Council can be appointed as President of the Authority. The In-
ternational Antitrust Authority cooperates with the President in
the administration of the International Antitrust Authority and
the execution of this Agreement, each member being competent
and responsible for a specific field of antitrust administration.
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Sec. 2: Powers of the International Antitrust Authority
Without prejudice to other provisions in this Agreement the
International Antitrust Authority shall have the following
powers:
(a) The International Antitrust Authority has a right to
ask for actions in individual antitrust cases or groups of
cases in the sense of this Agreement to be initiated by a na-
tional antitrust authority.
(b) The International Antitrust Authority has a right to
bring actions against national antitrust authorities in indi-
vidual cases or groups of cases before national law courts,
whenever a national antitrust authority refuses to take ap-
propriate measures against individual restraints of
competition.
(c) The International Antitrust Authority has a right to
sue private persons and undertakings as alleged parties or
initiators of a restraint of competition before national law
courts asking for injunctions against the execution of the
restraint.
(d) The International Antitrust Authority has a right of
national appeal even when it is not a party to the case but
under the same conditions as parties to the case.
(e) The International Antitrust Authority has the right
and duty to sue a Party to this Agreement before the Inter-
national Antitrust Panel whenever it is of the opinion that
this Party violates obligations under this Agreement.
(f) The International Antitrust Authority will assist
Parties to this Agreement in the promulgation of antitrust
laws and the institution of an efficient antitrust
administration.
Comments:
1. The International Antitrust Authority functions as an institu-
tion controlling the international execution and respect of the
Agreement.
a) The CONTRACTING PARTIES establish the International An-
titrust Authority. This will be realised by agreement on a Statute of
the Authority. The Authority will be headed by a President (lit. b) and
an International Antitrust Council (lit. c). The interrelations between
different organs have to be defined in the Statute.
b) Sec. 1 (b) and (c) contain organizational rules concerning the
International Antitrust Authority which have to be accepted in a fu-
ture Statute of the Authority. The institution of the President and the
International Antitrust Council act as the chief executives of the Au-
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thority. Their own position is an independent one in relation to the
Parties to the Agreement, guaranteed for example by their diplomatic
immunity or the non-renewable term of office. The Council has the ad-
vantage to further a specialization of its members in different fields of
antitrust law and to allow wider geographical representation of differ-
ent groups of states at the head of the Authority. At the same time, it
can be a forum where experienced candidates for presidency can be
found.
2. Suits in national antitrust cases before national institutions and
the right to initiate Panel proceedings are the main methods of control
of the Agreement attributed to the International Antitrust Authority
(Sec. 2 (a) to (e)). These rights of the International Antitrust Authority
are independent from a person's or undertaking's rights under Art. 17
Sec. 3.
a) Section 2 (a) refers to the International Authority's right to act
against national antitrust authorities that do not sufficiently execute
the Agreement's provisions. In such cases the International Authority
has a right to ask for antitrust measures to be taken by the national
antitrust authority.
b) Sec. 2 (b) supplements the preceding subsection (a) with a judi-
cial recourse whenever a national authority refuses to act according to
the initiatives of the International Antitrust Authority. However, it
has to be emphasized, that the issuance of administrative orders by the
International Antitrust Authority directly against private persons as
initiators of a restraint of competition is not possible. In its material
part, the Agreement has to accept national policies, using national
treatment and the minimum standards principle as legal methods. Ac-
cording to the minimum standards principle, the national legislator
has considerable discretion to deal with national policy issues in the
framework of general antitrust policy. Therefore, only a national au-
thority can administer the transformed Agreement in the domestic do-
main. On the other hand, the International Antitrust Authority has
the jurisdiction to ensure that a national antitrust authority or body
respects the Agreement's obligations (see Introduction, VI.).
c) Moreover, it may be necessary to grant the International Anti-
trust Authority a right to sue private persons before national courts.
This does not mean that the national law is applied by an international
authority. It is the law court that applies the law. In comparison to lit.
(a) and (b), Sec. 2 (c) has the advantage of a more direct control on the
basis of the entire national antitrust law. The International Antitrust
Authority is not limited to the control of the minimum standards of the
Agreement.
d) Sec. 2 (d) supplements Sec. 2 (b), providing for a right of appeal
of the International Antitrust Authority. Therefore, Sec. 2 (d) is the
legal basis for efficient control of national law courts in the interpreta-
tion of the Agreement.
e) Sec. 2 (e) contains the Authority's right and duty to initiate
Panel proceedings against Parties to the Agreement that violate provi-
sions of the Agreement. Sec. 2 (e) does not only contain a right but an
obligation to sue.
i) Sec. 2 (f) is especially important for countries without an anti-
trust tradition.
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ART. 20: THE INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PANEL
Sec. 1: Institution of the International Antitrust Panel (TAP)
(a) The CONTRACTING PARTIES will establish a perma-
nent International Antitrust Panel which shall operate in the
framework and subject to the rules of the Integrated Dispute
Settlement System set out in Annex 2 of the Agreement Estab-
lishing the MTO, to decide on disputes arising with regard to the
application of this Agreement. In doing so the CONTRACTING
PARTIES will agree on a Statute of the Panel.
(b) The members of the International Antitrust Panel shall
be appointed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES on the basis of
consensus for a once renewable term of 6 years. Members to the
panel shall be experienced in the field of national or interna-
tional antitrust law. Panelists shall serve in their individual ca-
pacities and not as government representatives. During their
term of office they are exclusively bound by this Agreement and
enjoy full diplomatic immunity.
Sec. 2: Actions Brought before the International Antitrust
Panel
Notwithstanding the right and duty of the International An-
titrust Authority to sue Parties to the Agreement (Art. 19 Sec. 2
(e)), each Party to the Agreement has a right to bring an action
against another Party before the International Antitrust Panel
whenever it is of the opinion that this other Party violates obli-
gations under this Agreement. In accordance with the Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, as set out in Annex 2 of the Agreement Establishing
the MTO, requests for panel proceedings are admissable only af-
ter consultants between the International Antitrust Authority
and the Parties concerned have failed to settle the dispute
within 60 days after the request for consultations.
Sec. 3: Legal Proceedings before the Panel
(a) The legal proceedings before the Panel shall be governed,
mutatis mutandis, by the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, as set out in Annex
2 of the Agreement Establishing the MTO, and by such supple-
mentary rules which the CONTRACTING PARTIES may adopt
at the proposal of the International Antitrust Authority. Pro-
ceedings shall be open to the parties to the dispute. Other inter-
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ested Parties to the Agreement and the International Antitrust
Authority have a right to be heard.
(b) Each private person or undertaking concerned in a par-
ticular antitrust case brought before the Panel has a right to be
heard.
(c) The International Antitrust Panel takes its decision on
purely legal grounds and on the basis of this Agreement.
Sec. 4: Decisions Passed by the Panel
(a) The International Antitrust Panel determines whether
the obligations under this Agreement have been violated.
(b) Decisions by the Panel are legally binding. If a national
judicial decision has been found to be inconsistent with obliga-
tions under this Agreement, the competent national law court or
other authorities have to reconsider their decision respecting the
findings of the International Antitrust Panel.
Comments:
1. Art. 20 concerns dispute resolution. Sec. 1 (a) contains a general
provision on the establishment of a Panel providing for the global com-
petence of the Panel to decide on disputes concerning the interpreta-
tion of the Agreement. The institution of the Antitrust Panel is
therefore complementary to the function of the International Antitrust
Authority. Whereas the International Antitrust Authority works as an
international administration, the Panel constitutes the forum of inter-
national antitrust jurisdiction. The notion of "Panel" is taken from the
traditional GATT dispute settlement procedure. Sec. 1 (b) contains
rules on the status of Panel members. Their judicial independence has
to be guaranteed. They are specialists in the field of antitrust law, ap-
pointed for a long term, and not, in difference to the present GATT
system, appointed ad hoc for individual cases and chosen among the
GATT representatives of GATT Contracting Parties. A renewal of the
term or office seems to be useful, so as to further the continuity of the
Panel's working.
2. Two different types of proceedings before the Antitrust Panel
can be distinguished. The first, and probably more important type of
proceedings is initiated by the International Antitrust Authority (Art.
19 Sec. 2 (e)). The second type, provided for in Art. 20 Sec. 2, is initi-
ated by Parties to the Agreement against other Parties. This second
type of proceedings is the cornerstone of dispute resolution between
different Parties to the Agreement concerning all questions or interpre-
tation of the Agreement. Violations of the Agreement can be found in a
Party's legislation, its antitrust administration or jurisdiction.
3. Proceedings before the Panel are strictly law-oriented (Sec. 3
(c)). Following this law-oriented approach, it is clear that concerned
parties to the international dispute must be heard. But in all cases the
International Antitrust Authority and each Party to the Agreement
must also have a right to intervene, even though they are not parties to
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the disputes. The Authority is the supervising institution and all Par-
ties to the Agreement should feel concerned if there is a violation (Sec.
3 (a)). In order to protect the interests of private persons concerned in
an individual case, the Panel must also hear such persons, although
they are not party to the international dispute (Sec. 3 (b)).
4. According to Sec. 4 (a) there are two possible forms of decision:
The pure confirmation of violation is appropriate in cases of non- or
non-sufficient implementation of the Agreement into domestic law. Ac-
cording to Sec. 4 (b) the Party concerned would have to change its law
accordingly. If it does not respect the decision, new Panel proceedings
can be initiated for non-respect of Art. 20 Sec. 4 (b). The possibility to
reject national judicial decisions as inconsistent with the Agreement is
a very efficient means to further the legal effect of the Agreement. Sec.
4 (b), in this case, provides for a binding effect of the Panel's decision
for the national legal system. Therefore, the Panel proceedings work
more like an appeal than an international dispute settlement proce-
dure. A similar form of dispute settlement with binding panel deci-
sions for national courts can be found in the Canadian-U.S. American
Free Trade Association Treaty.'
PART EIGHT: FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
AGREEMENT
ART. 21: FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGREEMENT
Sec. 1: Revisions to the Agreement
The International Antitrust Authority has the power to pre-
pare and propose revisions to the Agreement. Adoption of a re-
vision and recommendation for ratification by contracting
parties require unanimity minus 3 votes of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES. Each Party has one vote. In preparing revisions, the
International Antitrust Authority shall especially consider the
need for rules referring to specific groups of agreements between
private parties or to specific sectors of private and public
economy.
Sec. 2: Right to Initiative
Each Party to the Agreement has a right to initiate revi-
sions in the sense of Section 1. The CONTRACTING PARTIES
shall decide on such initiatives after submission of the Interna-
tional Antitrust Authority's independent opinion.
Comments:
1. Sec. 1 provides for the revision-making process. The principle of
unanimity has to be accepted in principle. Otherwise an anti-antitrust
majority could weaken the Agreement's philosophy. In order to ex-
clude stagnation, the principle of unanimity minus 3 seems to be
appropriate.
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In preparing future revisions special weight should be laid on
sectoral rules that take into consideration specific needs relating to
certain forms of restraints or to certain economic sectors. In this sense,
the purpose of Sec. 2 could even be a reorganization of present uncom-
petitive structures in specific fields of world economy, such as banking,
food, etc.
2. Sec. 2 could even be regarded as an additional form of dispute
settlement. Parties to the Agreement, that specifically suffer under
uncompetitive structures on the territory of other Parties can propose
measures to be taken in the framework of the Agreement. On a first
level, the International Antitrust Authority has to give its opinion, pos-
sibly in form of a report, evaluating the present, allegedly uncompeti-
tive situation, exploring possible counter-measures, and eventually
proposing a revision to the Agreement. On a second level, the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES shall have to discuss the report and eventually
accept a revised text of the Agreement.
